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Foreword

Well ahead of the 2012 elections PNG was confronted with politicians who had decided that the elections should be deferred. At least one minister spoke of this tactic as early as November 2011. Transparency International PNG was one of many organisations and individuals insisting that deferral was unconstitutional and something which should simply not be entertained. We felt that the Members of Parliament calling for the deferral were the same people who should, from the moment they were elected, have been working to ensure the electoral process was freed of the flaws which had become clear in 2007. Instead of doing this efforts were being made at the 11th hour to deny the people of PNG their right to be involved in selecting political leaders. We accepted assurances from the Electoral Commissioner that PNG was ready for elections and asked that the elections proceed. We were grateful to the Prime Minister and other MP's who also insisted that there be no attempt to defer the elections and we are grateful that we tested our electoral machinery which, despite some shocking failings, produced a new Parliament and a new opportunity to bring about changes the country needs if it is to be a democracy guided by validly elected representatives of the people.

Once again TI PNG provided election observers and now presents a report based on their observations. I would like to thank the observers who have given up their time to voluntarily conduct this observation of the elections and I dedicate this report to them. In some cases observers were kept away from their homes and families for many days. It was not easy work. I would also like to acknowledge that despite us providing standard allowance, many observers actually needed more than this, especially where they travelled over several days.

The work of the observers and our staff would not have been possible without the support of the Australian taxpayers, who have the gratitude of the board of TIPNG for this assistance.

I would also like to thank the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission as without their excellent cooperation our observation would also have been very difficult to organize.

As an observer we often gain a perspective of the electoral process few others get and it is often rewarding when we are thanked by the community and polling staff. However, frequently observing can be tiring and thirsty work and at times risky. The role of the observer was often not well understood by others and so at times the observers were met with suspicion. Thankfully, all of our observers have returned safely, and without any complaints from candidates or polling officials despite some serious threats.

In most cases, communities did recognize the importance of what was done, and that it was done for the good of the whole nation and thus they expressed their gratitude.

This observation has resulted in this report, which contains some very significant recommendations to strengthen the integrity of the Electoral Commission and the processes it uses.

The observers can therefore be well satisfied that their work has led to an outcome of real significance.

It will now be the work of the Transparency International Papua New Guinea staff and board to try and get political support for these improvements and others recommended by people and organisations with whom we share our concern that the election process is badly flawed. From now until 2017 the people of PNG need to be confident that real changes have occurred to build the integrity of the electoral process.

Lawrence Stephens
Chairman
Transparency International Papua New Guinea
2012
Introduction

This has been the second national election in which TIPNG has mounted a domestic election observation programme with the first nationwide observation being conducted for the 2007 National Parliamentary Elections.

In this report we start off with an executive summary which describes and reflects on our observation processes. TIPNG believes that observation and reporting on elections is a key role for civil society in our country and that our capacity to do this effectively as both an organization and a society is still fragile. Therefore we want this report to help point the way forward for future members and officeholders in civil society so they can follow our lead and further strengthen the type of oversight election observing brings.

The second section examines the results of our observation of the election, examines the apparent patterns and discusses the possible causes and consequences. In this report we also reflect upon the results of a voter expectation survey TIPNG did in the months before polling began looking into what voters want in terms election processes. (This survey is described later.)

The last section contains our recommendations to the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC), donors and other stakeholders on ways to improve the electoral process and the build upon the democratic culture of our country.

List of Abbreviations Used

ARO/RO    Assistant Returning Officer
ACC       Australian Civilian Corp
AUSAID    Australian Agency for International Development
CAIEI     Community Advocacy for Increased Election Integrity
COG       Commonwealth Observer Group
ESP       Electoral Support Programme (1, 2 & 3)
GGACE     Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Education project
GPS       Global Positioning System
IFES      International Foundation for Electoral Systems
MP        Member of Parliament
NCD       National Capital District
OLIPPAC   Organic Law on Political Parties and Candidates
PNGEC     Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission
TIPNG     Transparency International Papua New Guinea
SMS       Short Messaging Service
Executive Summary

TIPNG fielded 282 observers for the 2012 national parliamentary elections. This is more than double the number of observers compared with 2007. These observers came from all sectors of society and from a range of urban and rural locations. Communities, almost without exception\(^1\), welcomed our observers and felt they contributed to building the integrity of the process. This report analyses what the observers saw and other data as well as discussing key issues around election integrity.

It is TIPNG’s view that the 2012 National Parliamentary Elections were seriously flawed to the extent that our democratic traditions are continuing to be seriously compromised – and as a consequence the trust in the electoral process continues to dissipate. However, trust in the process is critical to the on-going democratic development of our society. We are not alone in our concerns, as what we say appears to be very similar to not only many of our leaders but also the Commonwealth Observer Group and the heads of some of the diplomatic missions and some of our own leaders. Our observers’ reports highlight these concerns, indicating that in 21% of polling places observed the election was either mostly unfair or very unfair. This is unacceptable. Furthermore, a large number of people appear to have been disenfranchised as a result of roll inaccuracy and possibly wrongful removal from the roll. This brings into question whether the will of the people was truly expressed. This problem was compounded by inadequate application of procedures and law, especially in regards to the use of the roll and the identification of voters. We were also very concerned by the highly variable application of the secret ballot, which we believe should NOT be compromised for the sake of cultural difference, if that was ever a relevant argument.

Why is trust in the electoral process declining? We have identified the following problems:
- the chaotic preparations and general level of disorganization within the PNGEC and other arms of government responsible for election preparedness and conduct.,
- the lack of a credible electoral roll,
- and the relative unwillingness of the PNGEC and others to punish wrong doers or declare an election null and void when there are clear and widespread breaches of procedure.

These are major contributors to this decline in trust in the electoral process.

While it is common for PNG’s unique set of cultures and geography to be attributed as causes, our view is that in comparison to the challenges much larger traditional societies face our problems are not so great that we should accept elections of such a low standard. The very fact that at the time of writing this report there are currently 104 petitions before the courts for 83 electorates – underscores this.

Some claim the elections were more peaceful than in previous years. We believe it is very difficult to make such a comparison but we would add that the level of violence that did occur – especially after polling, is completely unacceptable. However, if they were more peaceful, the PNGEC now needs to take advantage of the relative peace during elections to deliver more credible elections.

\(^1\)One observer from another group but with a TIPNG lanyard in Enga Province reported being told, by officers from PNGDF providing security at one polling station, that TI PNG was not welcome there. This incident was apparently linked to a TI PNG media comment reported on television. The observer who also represented several other groups, removed his TI PNG identification and used the others to continue to observe the election process.
We are concerned that the “peaceful” elections may be seen as meaning the same “free and fair” elections when of course they may not be. We believe that citizens and the government need to be far more demanding and less tolerant of the existing practises.

We see many of the problems as fixable, especially if there is more focus on incentivising good behaviour and longer term public education, rather than relying so greatly on force. Our recommendations on ways to fix many of these problems are contained later in this report.

Surely in what was Papua New Guinea’s 37th year of independence we must regard the fact that our former colonial master had to again step in with major logistical support for the elections as a sign of major systemic failure. There should be no doubt that the last minute “surge” provided by the Australian Civilian Corp (ACC) averted, what would have otherwise been an even larger failure. The work done by the ACC was impressive, but should not be mistaken for capacity building. (While most attention was paid to the air support – it was alarming to see the level of technical administrative support the ACC staff had to give to cover gaps that the PNGEC staff should have covered.)

Therefore, while TIPNG applauds donor interest in supporting democracy and governance programmes and much of the longer term work done by the Electoral Support Programme, TIPNG would like to see a major focus on improving the PNG Electoral Commission and areas of government responsibility impacting the conduct of elections. We recommend also careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of providing “surge” capacity for the 2017 elections as opposed to commencing action and education now, in preparation for those elections and other local level and by-elections looming.

As far as we are able to ascertain, in no other country, other than when a UN peace keeping mission has been operating, has this type of support been given. It is disappointing to find ourselves dependent on foreign governments to conduct the most important expression of our democratic and independent nationhood and our focus should be directed towards ensuring we provide appropriate resources and conduct our own elections with efficiency and integrity.

There is much talk of the potential of a biometric roll to improve the election process. However, it is our belief that the introduction of new technology like this will only lead to significant improvements if there is a reformation in the way the Electoral Commission operates, and its accountability mechanisms are made more effective.

Alarmingly, we are informed that there are anecdotes alleging corrupt practices within the commission itself. Furthermore, it would seem that the commission’s internal financial and contracting practices and priorities need review. It is our view that while the commission as noted by our and other observer reports, failed on basic logisticsthe total amount of funding was not the cause. We understand, for example, apparently lavish spending on the running of workshops and conferences and unfortunate lack of spending in areas where real improvements could have been made.

We believe that the introduction of new technology will be unsuccessful unless we also ensure that checks and balances are in place, throughout the organisation. Failure is likely to be attributed to the new technology when it is in fact clear that reforms in human behaviour and accountability are required if we are to improve the overall integrity of the electoral process.
However, we strongly believe that if the operations of the electoral commission are reformed and its capacity is built to take more ownership of running its own election, then the introduction of the biometric roll and a host of other reforms can in fact be very effective.

As a consequence, any on-going support from donors should be focussed on reform and significantly raising standards. We think that the current trend of accepting or lowering standards by doing such things as supporting the use of generic ballot papers without the names of electorates as was done in Nawae Open - for whatever reason - is taking us in the wrong direction.

In conclusion, the board and membership of TIPNG believe the tax paying citizens both private and corporate of Papua New Guinea, deserve better and believe this is achievable – and probably within the current budget of the PNGEC and with no greater level of funding support from donors.
Section One: The TIPNG Election Observation Process

Why is TIPNG Observing Elections

In doing this observation, we had the following objectives.

1. To report to the PNGEC any gross abuses of election processes
2. To report to citizens on whether the elections were free and fair
3. To encourage better and more transparent processes - just because we are there!
4. To provide evidence to courts if results are disputed
5. To show citizens that they can contribute to the integrity of electoral processes

The last objective is in some ways the most important. People may feel that there is nothing they can do but cast their vote and that they have no role in protecting the integrity of the process. In more extreme situations, people when faced with mob rule and money politics often feel completely disempowered.

Who, How, Many & Where Were the Observers

The observers were TIPNG members, university students, former Youth Democracy Camp participants, etc., but all citizens concerned about the quality of the elections. Very few had ever observed before.

In 2012 we trained 340 observers, and of these 282 were out in the field. In total 621 polling place observations were conducted. On average each observer observed 2 polling places with a grand total of 431 polling places being observed. The region that had the most polling places observed and observations conducted was the Highlands and the least number was done in Momase. Given that it is difficult to be sure how many polling places there were (figures below and above 10,000 have been cited) and because some polling places were observed by more than one observer we have concluded that approximately 5% of polling places were observed by TIPNG.

Because we changed the way the accreditation was done, (we accredited people assuming they would participate and not after training) the number of those trained is less than those accredited (510). However, if people did not attend training we did not give them manuals or the accreditation cards.

In 2007 we trained and accredited 123 observers and in total only 77 polling places observations were conducted.

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1In fact we think the final total was a little higher as we know some observer books which we had sighted before completion were lost in the post.
2We would like to thank the Electoral Commissioner for his very efficient accreditation process.
### TABLE OF PNG OBSERVERS, OBSERVATIONS & POLLING PLACE BY PROVINCE 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of Observers Observing in Province*</th>
<th>Observations Conducted</th>
<th>Polling Places Observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENB</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNB</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NGI Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>154</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>Gulf</td>
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<td>NCD</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORO</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>West</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enga</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiwaka</td>
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<td>Simbu</td>
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<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hela</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highlands Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td><strong>198</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
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<td>Madang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morobe</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Momase Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>315</strong></td>
<td><strong>621</strong></td>
<td><strong>431</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note that some observers worked in two or more provinces so this is not the same as the total number of observers which as 282.

In some provinces, we did not recruit or send observers, partly because the potential danger and partly because we knew the province would be well covered by the Australian National University observer team. In others such as Manus, it was decided it was not cost effective to travel there because of its small population and the high cost. (Although we did have one observer there who did note some questionable conduct.)

In the end we were reliant on people volunteering to observe and so in some provinces we did not get the number of observers we hoped for, or despite accrediting them some did not turn up for training or wedid not receive their books back.
Chapter Partnerships

In 2012, we invited and funded members from all the Transparency International chapters in the Pacific Islands to join our observer team. We had two observers from TI Fiji (the executive director and a board member) and one staff member from TI Vanuatu. They all commented that they found it a very interesting and useful experience in that it would greatly assist them launch similar initiatives in their own countries. Although there was not time for TI Vanuatu to implement such an activity as their parliamentary elections were shortly after the PNG elections, in Fiji this is certainly practical.

Observer Training

Almost all of our observers were trained and received their observer packs in the week before the elections started in their province.

The training was limited to a forty minute session and focussed on staying safe and not interfering regardless of what they saw. It should be noted that for most observers this was the first time to observe an election and the first time they had taken part in any form of a survey. Furthermore, many of our observers had not even been to a polling place before.

Limitations

Clearly, as we were relying on volunteers, it was impossible to ensure that we had equal representation across the country. Even though we covered all regions and most provinces, we cannot say that we had a “representative sample” of all polling places. For this reason the results should be understood to be representative only of the areas in which we observed.

Because we knew people were mostly taking time off work we only expected the observers to observe on polling day and only in their own locality. Therefore unlike most of the international observer groups, we did not formally observe such electoral elements as the enrolment, roll checking, candidate nomination processes and the campaign itself. It should also be noted that due to the lack of transport for observers or security concerns observers generally did not accompany the ballot boxes back to the counting and storage centres.

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4 We did also have one New Zealander, one Australian and one Solomon Island observer, but they did not represent the TI chapters of those countries.
However, some observers in the Highlands especially, decided to “follow” the elections and so observed the elections in more than one polling place over several days, as did many of the TIPNG staff. Moreover, some observers were able to watch parts of the count process – something that was not done in 2007.

**Variance in Perceptions**

Election observation will always be a fairly subjective exercise – especially where we are asking observers new to the task to make judgements regarding the scale or seriousness of an occurrence. For example, we found that while in some areas observers did not seem to regard the occasional giving of the polling staff some betel nut as bribery, in other areas they seemed to have a much more purist approach and considered giving anything to polling staff as an attempt to influence the outcome.

We also found that there was a considerable variance where we were asking whether the elections were “free and fair”. This was partly due to people’s previous experience of elections. Therefore, where there was no violence, even though many of the factors required for a democratic election were missing (e.g. secret ballot), some observers saw the elections as an improvement and thus “fair”.

This was fairly obvious in the answers given as the verbatim reports of any one observer often told of serious abuse and yet the election were seen by the same observer as fair as this observer comment shows. “From my observation as a citizen living in this electorate (Morata) people went out and voted freely and fairly, however, some hiccups such as no names were found in the common roll and voting without a common roll was common. Also under age voting was being witnessed. Candidates for both regional open had given cash to many voters, which I have never seen or witnessed before.”

In this instance and others what appears to be happening is that the observer is commenting on whether the voters acted in a free and fair manner – rather than apply this description to all stakeholders, and especially the candidates, their supporters and the polling staff.

This clearly does not align with the more usual definition of free and fair which relates to an equal chance for all contestants through the consistent application of processes and an equal opportunity for voters to participate without inducements or intimidation. (See Guiding Principles of Electoral Integrity [http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/ei20](http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/ei20))

Clearly in any future observation we should give greater stress to the meaning of free and fair elections.

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**The 2012 TIPNG Voter Expectations Survey**

Prior to the 2012 election TIPNG independently funded and conducted a survey into voter expectations of what should occur at elections in terms of process. It was available online or as a paper copy.

A total of 1102 people from all over the country filled in the survey. (23% of respondents came from Port Moresby) The survey had 19 multi-choice questions with 5 questions regarding the respondent identity. The results of this survey are referred in this report and tagged as the “VOTER EXPECTATIONS SURVEY”.

**2011 TIPNG Corruption Perceptions Survey**

In 2011 TIPNG surveyed 1800 people in a randomly selected and representative sample all over the country to find out how people understood what corruption is, its consequences and if they were playing any part in corrupt practices. In a few places we have referred to this where the data relates to this observation.
Security of Observers

We were concerned given the predictions of increased election violence that we might have observers injured or even killed. As a consequence we set up a risk management system (see appendices) the core of which was to stress that if the situation became too tense they should withdraw or seek the protection of the police.

As it was we had only one security situation where one of our own staff in Jiwaka, Father Steven Kaupa, was ordered to leave by a candidate with threats of violence, despite police presence. He did leave and there was no violence.

Interestingly, we did have one observer, who managed to intervene and prevent an angry crowd bashing a polling team. While we did not encourage this kind of intervention we acknowledge the sense of justice this observer showed.

Behaviour of Observers

To ensure that observers did not cause problems the training emphasized that their role was strictly limited regardless of what offices they had held previously. Furthermore, we printed our hotline number on our observer T-shirts, in case any polling staff or members of the public wanted to ring and complain.

We had a total of one complaint – where an observer in Port Moresby was accused of shouting at polling staff. However, despite our following this up we were unable to verify this.

While we did make clear that observers were volunteers, and would not be paid, we did have a small group who later refused to hand back their books without payment. We did not pay them and subsequently most of that group did return their books.

Overall we were very happy with the behaviour of observers. They all seemed to abide by the code of conduct and take their roles very seriously as this comment from an observer in Kavieng shows: "As an election observer in both polling and counting I experience so many things and also come across so many things that as a TIPNG observer, we were told not to do or ask to do and it was tough for me as a first timer. Overall this shows that such things as nationwide civil society observation of elections can be conducted safely and without disrupting polling.

Logistics

We always knew that the logistics would be a challenge, and so we got the accreditation process over as early as possible. However, there were still issues with transporting observers, where they were willing to observe outside their own locality. These issues were mostly dealt with by having the TIPNG staff with drivers’ licences hiring cars and driving the teams of observers to polling places and then picking them up again.

Observer Manual

The observer manual, where observers recorded their findings, had an expanded polling place questionnaire, a simplified voter interview form and a new count questionnaire as compare with what we did in 2007. The manual was designed with consideration of TIPNG’s capacity
and time to analyse the data and to make it easy to use for observers unused to data collection processes.

**Polling Place Questionnaire**

We decided to select a few areas to look at that would give an overall picture of the integrity of the whole process and we generally chose things that would mostly be readily observable. These included questions around:

- the opening process such as the actual time of opening and the procedures applied.
- the polling process itself, the provision of materials and staff, the application of procedures such as the application of ink, indications of any coercion or bribery, the partiality of staff etc.
- the closing process including the time and key record keeping and ballot box security

Some questions such as the number of ballots received, was simply designed to see if presiding officers were keeping records in the new election journal.

As well as just recording in criteria based scales we also asked observers for written comments. Although not all observers gave us these – they were sometimes very revealing.

**Voter Interview**

The interview of individual voters was designed to find out what voters themselves felt about the elections as we realize that our own observations can be biased or at odds with reality, especially if the observer was not from that area. The questions sampled attitudes about specific actions that could have occurred and then the extent to which the voters thought this made the elections free and fair or not.

These voter surveys were often difficult to conduct as the questions often needed to be translated in Tok Pisin, and even then they were difficult for some respondents to understand. As a result the number filled in was far lower than the number of polling place questionnaires and so we decided to only use their verbatim comments rather than quantify the results.
Section Two: The Election Observation Report

Report Structure

This section is structured around three questions. Obviously, to an extent these overlap with each other. For example, if the rolls are not accurate then clearly it is unfair for the voters who were wrongly excluded. The themes are:

- Were the elections were “free and fair”? (Secret voting, Intimidation, Bribery, Impartiality, Post election violence etc.)
- Was Polling Place Management & Election Administration of a sufficient quality? (Time Open, Polling Place Locations, Application of Processes, Roll Accuracy, Security, etc.)
- What was the Response to Observers?

Note on Reporting Results

When reporting results we have stated the number or percentage of observations that showed something, and not the percentage of polling places, or the percentage of observers as in some cases observers observed more than one polling place or because sometimes a single polling place was observed by more than one observer.

In most cases observers answered every question. However, in some cases the number of people answering a particular question was low. In these cases we have either omitted the data or reported how many responded.

Each section looks at a question or set of related questions. For each we have included actual comments from the observers’ books. However, these have been edited so as to ensure that there are no names of candidates, their supporters or polling staff. We have also corrected spelling, mistyping and rephrased sentences where the reduction in context makes it difficult to infer the intended meaning.

Under the watchful eye of a police officer, polling officials appeared to be completing ballot papers. Observers reported this happening frequently.
Were the Elections Free & Fair?

Overall Observations

Overall 34% of polling place observations reported the elections as being very fair with another 45% stating they were mostly fair. This did not seem to accord with the written comments observers made. We believe this principally happened as observers are over rating the fact that in their view the elections were more peaceful. Their comments, in contrast, show that despite the relative peace, the elections were often far from fitting with the traditional view of a free and fair election as stated by the International Parliamentary Union\(^5\).

However, even these numbers are troubling. No election commission should see it as acceptable that in 45% of polling places that observers found that elections were only mostly fair and that 21% of polling places observers thought they were either mostly unfair or very unfair.

We can see that there were regional differences with the Highlands reporting the highest levels of Mostly Unfair or Very Unfair followed by Momase. No observers in the New Guinea Islands Region rated the elections as Very Unfair and 60% of observation in that region thought they were Very Fair. This is markedly different to the Highlands where only 12% thought they were Very Fair.

Typical of comments from those who thought the election was unfair is this from Angoram Open:

“This elections seems to be unfair. 1. Helpers were always chosen by the supporters and not by the voter. 2. Presiding officer and polling clerks did not follow their code of ethics. 3. Security personnel were not moving around to observing the election processes. 4. Unnecessary people walking in and out of the polling place without fear. 5. Overcrowding at the table of polling clerks to check names. 6. Ward members and other man were there at the table.”

Daulo Open: It is very unfair because as I stood there, there were three candidate but the people could not choose their first preference but they decide whom to vote for second preference. These candidate do that unfair practice in their own clan and people went home with great anger.”

For those who thought the election was fair but that had comments that indicated otherwise these are typical,

Kavieng Open: “The election was very fair and proper, but few people did act stupidly because they were being bribed.”

Moresby North East: “Voting at this polling area was mostly fair, voters were free of intimidations, however one way or the other most voters were bribed. And most of them turned away, because no names were on the roll book.”

Hagen Open: “They didn’t follow the common roll but were called in 5 at a time males and females and were very fast and fair.”

Ijivitari Open: “The 2012 National Election is safe, free and fair, however, who is to be blamed for most ballot papers not used because most eligible voters missed their names not being mentioned. Therefore the electoral commission has to be blamed for not updating the common roll properly.”

Anglimp South Waghi: “Overall people commended the process as "fair" and "peaceful" although some voters said was not ‘democratic’.”

Rai Coast Open: “The elections here were fair, but proper process were not followed by the voters and voters were not able to cast their vote secretly.”

Dei Open: “Mostly fair, although they used the ward roll, any male just went in and voted using any name for men and they voted more than once and the underage people also voted.”

Mendi Open: “At this polling place I had observed that it was mostly fair because most voters were forced to vote but others were free to cast their votes. I had also seen that the left over ballot papers were forced to sign by presiding officer and one person casting the vote for his candidate. Also there were scrutineers forcing the presiding officer and he almost lost control of his work and the present head Administrator was there telling the presiding officer to move the polling place to different location because he had seen that people vote for their choice and they were not in line with his candidate ….”

However, there were also many comments that clearly indicated that the elections were fair in their view.

Rabaul Open: “The election was here was very fair, free and safe because every process was followed and people behave.”

The following comment indicates that perceptions of whether the elections were free and fair depend on what we think is normal and a proper process.

Anglimp South Waghi: “Once voting was completed the crowd clapped. People by and large thought the process was fair because they thought it was right that their candidate get the ballots.”

**Ballot Box Integrity**

While there were reports in the media that ballot boxes were hijacked or hidden in the Highlands, only 7% of observations showed this. The region with the highest reporting of this was in the Islands (19%) where comments suggest that the box was being removed to protect it from the weather. But there were other reasons as these comments show.
Was the ballot box ever taken away or hidden during polling?

**Yes** 7%

**No** 93%

If the ballot box taken away, why?

- **Weather** 46%
- **Unknown / Other** 27%
- **Ballot Box Full** 10%
- **Fights** 16%

Common Roll Accuracy

By far the most common complaint was that the common roll was inaccurate. The observers in the regions outside the highlands often commented that people were frequently turned away from the polling place because their names were not on the roll. This resulted in claims that the elections were not fair. Clearly, if the person did not enrol, or went to the wrong ward then this is understandable. However, there were many comments stating that people had voted in 2007 and in some cases for many elections previous to this, but who had not moved and now found themselves not on the roll. This indicates that there were major problems with accuracy.

Rai Coast: “Many under age people were voting who I believed to be right from Elementary School, because there wasn’t any proper update of the common roll.”

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6 We have included this in this section as it seemed to be such a dominant theme in regards to whether elections are free and fair.
Kerema Open: “Note that this team stayed in this place for 3 days now, the people were complaining about their names not being in the common roll, and demanded to have the common roll for 2007 to be used instead of the recent one.”

Madang Open: “Many eligible voters do not have their names in the common roll, and also some names were jumbled up and found in the other areas or places. Also many names were not correctly spelt and following the order of the family which was really disgraceful and offensive to the voters.”

Goroka Open: “Irregularities on the names, missing names, ghost names and names of people from outside found. These people from outside voted with villages in ward 8.”

While in most places, too few people appear to be enrolled – and as a consequence there were allegedly too few ballots, sometimes however, the number of ballots far exceeded the number of entries on the roll. Tambul Nebilyer: “The number of voters on the roll was 567 and 935 ballot papers were received for this ward.” (Where there was only one polling place.)

It seems strange that despite the total number of eligible voters in PNG being nearly 4.5 million (which itself is odd given that a very significant proportion of the population are under 18) so many people were not on the roll.

The lack of confidence in the roll encouraged some perverse behaviour from voters as this comment shows. “Students at Madang teachers college wanted to use their own class list to vote. They demanded that they all should vote regardless of the fact that their names were not in the Electoral Roll.”

Our Voter Expectations Survey indicated that a significant percentage (87%) of our participants thought that if the roll was not used or it was inaccurate then the result was meaningless.

Voters claiming previous enrolment

Overall 37% of observations show observers witnessed very many or many times voters who claimed that they had been on the roll in that locality and had voted before, but who were unable to vote because their names were now not on the roll. (There was little variation by region.) This percentage is especially worrying given that each time it was witnessed the observer could have been referring to more than one voter as these observer comments indicate:

Kokopo Open: “Sixty five people only turned up for election. Nine voted and 57 were turned away, as their names were not on the common roll.”

North Fly Open: “I arrived at the polling place at midday and was surprised to find that only six people had voted, despite the polling place being open for several hours. I stayed for another three hours and by then only another ten people had voted, despite about 70 people turning up and finding they were not on the roll. They went away very frustrated as they had voted here in 2007 and earlier.”

Wewak Open: “From the observation made in this polling area, it is very frustrating to see most eligible voters turned away from the polling area because most of their names were not on the common roll. Some of these eligible voters have been living there for almost ten to twenty years. Like the Catholic missionaries there were also High School teachers, nurses and other voters who complained and argued with the polling clerk.”
Moresby North East: “Many eligible voters who voted in the last three election are not on the common roll for 2012 election.”

Kavieng Open: “Many voters weren’t happy because their name are not the election roll; especially all those voters that voted in the 2002 and 2007 national elections.”

Rabaul Open: “Many people didn’t vote for 2012 general election because their names were not found in the common roll and were turned away, and were surprised because they have voted in the past elections and couldn’t vote now. The common roll was not properly up-dated. Long-time villages were turned away because their names were not in the common roll. The census that took place in 2011 confused the general public that they thought they were enrolling their names in the common roll.”

Given that in the Highlands the roll was mostly not used, or not used properly for identification, we can disregard the figures from there. (Observers in the highlands did report in some locations that voters and local leaders did claim that not enough ballots had been supplied compared to 2007 or what they thought were the eligible number of voters.)

However, given the rumours of over enrolment and yet claims elsewhere of whole clans being removed from the roll it is hard to know how to work with responses to this question in the Highlands region.

While it may be the case that people assumed they were on the roll, deliberately lied so they might be able to vote, or confused the roll update with the census, the data still indicates a major failure in the roll update and validation process. If this translated into 37% of the electorate being disenfranchised – then it is hard to argue that we truly know what the ‘will of the people’ really was. It is particularly alarming as despite the fact that the total number of people on the roll increased, large numbers of people who voted previously seem to have disappeared from the roll. Given that the legal procedure for removing someone from the roll is quite arduous, we want to see a serious investigation into what happened.

Clearly, one possibility is that names were shifted from one ward/locality to another. In NCD there were many complaints that the reorganization of polling places, so they dealt with alphabetical sections of the roll, also caused confusion due to inadequate public awareness about the change. This was not helped with poor descriptors of the polling locations. e.g. shop, church.

Some may point out that it is the citizens’ responsibility to check that they are on the roll. While this is of course ideal and should be encouraged, this was not as easy as it might have
seemed, especially if they were not publically read out or displayed. This is especially so, given that there are reports that people were asked to pay before being able to see the roll.

In future, the PNGEC should encourage a public reading and display of the roll. Although this might be difficult to achieve when significant roll updates are being completed very close to the elections, a check of long-time older residents could surely be made months before the election date.

Ideally, in future, an independent audit needs to be conducted on the roll where there are electoral disputes and small winning margins – and where large scale disenfranchisement has occurred – a bye election be ordered.

Our Voter Expectations Survey showed that 87% of people surveyed thought that the proper use of the electoral roll and proper updating of the roll is critical to the integrity of the results.

There also needs to be a review of the way localities are determined. This is especially important before any start is made on a biometric roll as ideally voters would be linked to localities (each of which would have a unique code number) and then to polling places. This should be fairly easy to accomplish as much of this data must already exist in relation to schools, clinics and prospecting licences and through the work done by the National Statistics Office. Probably the largest task will be linking the current localities to global positioning coordinates. However, much of this has also already been done by the Australian Civilian Corp staff and defence teams in the lead up to the elections.

Clearly, some staff within the electoral commission need to be held accountable, especially if it can be shown that there was deliberate removal of voter names favouring particular candidates as some rumours allege. To ensure this happens in future there will be a need to have some kind of complaints and audit system in the PNGEC.

**Voter Number Slips – Good or Bad**

Observers from all over the country noted that in some places voters came to the polling places with slips of paper containing the voter’s name and roll line number and on the reverse - voting instructions with the numbers of the preferred candidates.

While this is no doubt a form of campaigning – it also suggests that candidates if given the right incentives have the capacity to enhance the functioning of elections and thus under certain circumstances this practice could be encouraged. For example, candidates and particularly political parties, should possibly be better used for a whole variety of functions.

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7 It was probably the lack of a locality coding system that led to the farcical situation where one locality, Gamar, had a polling place for two electorates (Kerowagi & South Waghi) and thus the people voted twice in one week.

8 TIPNG would like to thank Ched Flego for this idea.
such as roll integrity checks and voter education. While candidate influence is an issue – where all candidates and parties can be involved as scrutineers – the negative effects could largely cancel each other out.

However, it also has the capacity to subvert the process and simply be campaigning and nothing to do with identification as this comment shows:

Anglimp South Waghi: As with other polling places in this area, many voters brought a note with their voter preferences. The process for this in unknown although I did see young men going through the crowd checking these notes and “correcting them”.

Other Comments from observers regarding the electoral roll from around the country.

Pomio Open: “Majority of the people who came to vote found their name was not in the common roll”.

Kairuku – Hiri Open: “There was an extra day of polling in Porebada was requested as close to a 1000 people had not voted on the two days set aside for Porebada. But although the extra day was given only about a 100 people turned up that day. Polling officials said this may because the roll has double entries and ghost names.”

Vanimo Open: “How come the names were taken during the common roll update that was done and were then not printed in the common roll?”

North Waghi: “Many people haven’t voted because their names were not there in the common roll, which was unfair for they have the right to choose a leader by voting.”

Buka, North Bouganville: “A lot of voters could not vote because their names were not on the electoral roll and that caused a lot of confusion and frustration among the voters”

Mul Baiyer: “Proper processes were not followed because the total population of Kunuka Kilika one was 1600, and only 592 cast their vote as 592 ballot papers arrived at the polling area. The entire crowd were frustrated and got mad because many of them didn’t have the chance to vote on that day. Most voters were not checked and ticked according to the common roll.”

Imbongu Rural: “Most voters didn’t exercise their constitutional rights as their names were not updated in the common roll and also there wasn’t enough papers, which resulted in complaints and forced voting.” (Forced voting means when voters are forced to vote following the wishes of others.)

Appropriation of the Voting Rights of Others

This question was designed to capture incidents such as where husbands were using the ballot papers of their wives. However, observer comments indicate that it was also used to capture incidents where candidate supporters manipulated or simply took control over the ballots of the illiterate and elderly. This is more explicitly covered by the question after this one.
It is unacceptable that 17% of observations reported that voting on behalf of others without their agreement or even being present happened many or very many times.

When we break this down by region we can see very significant differences. While in the Islands region it was not prevalent (over 80% of observations never saw this) in the Highlands region it was more frequently reported (just under 30% never saw this) and so 70% did see it.

While 17% may seem like a small number this is a very significant abuse and of course the actual occurrence may be larger because of course this is simply surveying whether something was seen – whereas in many cases it may have been difficult to detect.

However, sometimes it was done very blatantly with polling officers issuing ballots with the first preference already filled in. The fact that there was comparatively little argument about this suggests that either people were too scared to complain, or that agreement had been reached earlier.

The results from our Voter Expectations Survey found that 87% of participants thought that the results of an election in an electorate are meaningless if people can vote more than once. This is in essence, what happens when people appropriate the voting rights of others. This tells us as much about the need for measures to prevent this from occurring as it does about their belief about how election integrity is interfered with by these kinds of behaviours.
Assistance to Illiterate & Disabled Voters

Overall we can see that while this was abided by, with 63% of observations reporting this happens always or mostly, in the Highlands especially, there were very serious and consistent breaches. Observer comments indicate that not only did supporters (who were not obviously family members, given how many times they did it) just take the ballots of the elderly and illiterate – they filled them in without consultation or agreement of the voter.

Ijivitari Open: “The same helpers were being used over and over again, which were not chosen by voters. This effected the women and elderly men.”

Angoram Open: “Helpers were always chosen by the supporters and not by the voter.”

Sohe Open: “There wasn’t any bribing but I noticed voters pulling disabled, very old, and mentally ill people into the polling place to vote for candidates that were against their will.”

Daulo Open: “Youth were forcing themselves on others especially, women and old men including illiterates. They were standing by the polling compartment and doing all the writing like candidates name and numbers. It shows that the youths got bribed to do that.”

Rai Coast Open: “Mostly unfair and proper processes were not followed, anybody can vote on behalf of somebody else without any arrangement or without the person being present.”

- unfortunately even polling officials were involved in this practise with the polling official taking the ballot and filling it in without any consultation with the voter.

Electoral laws around the world and in PNG are quite clear about this – the person assisting must respect the voters’ right to choose their helper and must abide by the voting preferences of the person they are assisting.

The appropriation of the rights of others was done on a very large scale in some polling places and it was difficult at times to establish whether intimidation was being used. The fact that it was often the same person assisting and that they had no right to be in the polling place suggests that voters had little choice about who “assisted” them,
whether they really needed or wanted that assistance and most importantly what preferences were cast.

Despite this manipulation – even in the Highlands region observers did occasionally see polling officials going to great lengths to apply the law in the way it was intended, with family members assisting the elderly and illiterate in a lawful way. This is important as it demonstrates that if the law is adhered to, the proper way to assist voters is not unknown.

**Multiple Voting**

Multiple voting can occur when a voter goes repeatedly to vote, or as is more easy to detect, when they receive more than one open and one regional ballot when entering the polling place. It is obviously most likely to occur when the identification process is weak.

**Receipt of multiple papers**

Overall 48% of observers who answered this question witnessed multiple voting. However, given the very low number of observers who answered this (100) – we would assume that most of those who did not answer it, did not see it occurring. If that was the case then the actual percentage of occurrence was about 7% which is still worrying as this is only the detection level. When breaking this down by region we can see that virtually all of the occurrences were in the Highlands region.

Particularly disappointing to see was that polling officials in some Highlands provinces themselves were often involved. This occurred, particularly towards the end of polling, where voters had become tired of voting over and over again, time was short and so the polling officials often with the approval of the security personnel, decided to fill in all remaining ballots.

**Voting on Multiple Occasions**

Overall 13% of observations witnessed that voters were seen going repeatedly into the queue to vote, or as was much less common, receiving more than one ballot paper. Because observers cannot be there all the time and because this activity is often hidden even this percentage is alarming. If we break the responses down by region we can see that this was observed most often in Highlands region (38%) and least in the Islands region (3%).
What is unstated in these figures is the number of times the voter went to vote. As one observer noted in Mul Baiyer, some voters were seen entering the line to vote more than 10 times.

The Voter Expectations Survey result show us that 87% of participants either agree or strongly agree that multiple voting is illegal and damaging to the integrity of the election results.

Better training by the PNGEC is needed and of course where this occurs the PNGEC must be prepared to punish offenders. It was particularly alarming that in some cases observers noted that this kind of behaviour was done in the view of security forces without their reacting. This is very clearly illegal. Unfortunately, this was not the only type of obviously illegal behaviour that was in essence, condoned by the security forces.

**Money Politics and Intimidation**

Many commentators and other observer groups have commented about the rise of money politics in PNG. Our survey had two questions regarding the polling day process, which dealt with this – although of course any abuse of electoral process could have been encouraged with bribery.

One observer stated that in Melanesian culture (as it is in many others) it is often expected that village people will provide lunch for polling officials and security. This is a positive reaction and should be distinguished from attempts to deliberately corrupt the proper process of the voting.

**Selling of ballot papers**

Overall, only 3% of observations reported seeing the actual selling of ballot papers.

This is probably because this is not the mechanism which is used to manipulate the vote and anyway if it was, it probably would not occur in the polling place. However, there were comments indicating that this happened in NCD. “*Some people refused to cast their vote and brought the ballot papers out and sold it to others.*”

**Bribery or Intimidation of Voters**

It is alarming that overall 35% of observations (190) reported that there was evidence of bribery or intimidation occurring. If we break the responses down by region we can see that this occurred most often in Highlands region and least in the Islands and Southern regions. What stands out is that even in the Islands and Southern regions, there is a 20% occurrence and that Momase is only marginally behind the rate in the Highlands. This lends support to the argument that many of the practices encountered in the Highlands are also now found in other parts of PNG.
Rabaul Open: “The election here was unfair because the people were intimidated by the supporters of the other candidates.”

Manus: “... it was reported that a well known person was telling voters to vote for a certain candidate by giving out goods (not named) and place their hands on bible.”

Interestingly, 64% of the bribery and intimidation incidents were personally witnessed by the observers. This did not vary much by region.

Again it is important to remember that simply because there was no evidence that does not mean that it did not occur. In other words, if 35% saw evidence we can be fairly sure that actual occurrences were higher. As this observer comment indicates the misdeeds often happened before polling.

Goroka Open: “Although polling went smoothly, without any violence on polling day, voters were already bribed prior to polling. There were also stories of voters selling their 2nd and 3rd preference to other candidates. Obviously people decisions to vote was influenced earlier on, prior to voting.”

Ungai Bena Open: “Bribery and intimidation reported as occurring the day and or night before but not at polling. There was a general atmosphere of fear around the polling area because there were stories of the local candidate intimidating voters of the consequences of not voting for him.”

Lae Open: “The same candidate went around the settlements giving money and food. Many campaign houses around Lae city especially in settlements.” .... “Candidates giving food and money at night (Friday 23 June) especially in the settlements. 2) Unemployed youth were given money to provide protection for candidates and given hired vehicles to be used to 1)Monitor voters. 2) Threaten voters. 3) Monitor polling official after hours.”

It is clear from the following quotes that bribing has become to an extent “normal” in many communities. Votes are being allocated based on a monetary or goods exchange with only a short term advantage being acceptable to the voter.

Daulo Open: “Bribing was very common across all ages. A woman who I interviewed said they had receive money from different candidates before voting. The one which they receive most from was their first preference than follow with candidate with least money offer.”

Madang Open: “A woman in her late forties reported to me that an intending candidate contesting the Madang open seat promised to give her some money, but he didn’t and that’s why she didn’t vote .”

Yangoru Sausia: “From my observations and from what I heard. This election has been one that a lot of money has been used to lure voters or direct bribery. Some people or voters who reported bribery said that it was "partly fair" because it is their chance to benefit of something. One elderly man said, This is my chance to get some money and vote because I might die and not benefit of government services. Another person said "because we do not see tangible development. This is our chance to get something from candidates" Many people reported "partly fair" for bribery because of the above reasons.”
Dei Open: “There were huge amount of pigs and money were given by candidates to the voters and their supporters to vote for them. A regional candidate threw notes(money) through the air and the people collected them.”

The following comments indicate that candidates and their supporters seem to act with impunity, or believe they can do so- which strengthens this normalization effect.

Wabag Open: The polling area was a battle field. Houses were burnt. Candidates raced to take hold of the ballot box. Clearly, polling officials and security personal were bribed. Scrutineers were racing to get to vote for their candidate. At one point a few meters away from me, policeman were distributing cash to voters.

Mendi Open: “This polling place was base vote of a candidate and they (the tribesmen plus the candidate) killed pig and bought food stuff like, buai, smoke, coca cola etc. So the presiding officer sign for the candidate.”

Daulo Open: “Supporter of a candidate showed their wantoks that they were forced by other candidate supporters to vote for their candidate and later they were frustrated and very upset. They decided to burn their houses, but leaders and pastors negotiated with each other and made reconciliation.”

Angoram Open: It was around 1:00pm when 3 drunken youths armed with bush knives came into the polling place whilst voting was on progress intending to attack the polling officials. They cut the sticks planted to tie rope for the polling and rushed into. The reason for the actions was they were not happy with the selection made for the polling officials for this elections. The auxiliary policeman were over powered by their aggressiveness and weapons. The voters then assisted the policeman and fight back. The presiding officer and the polling clerks quickly pack the ballot papers, election journal and the common roll. Ballot Box was quickly picked up by a policeman and put away in the boat. The Presiding Officer suspended polling in the presence of the mobile squad at 1:50pm and left for other polling place.

In one polling place in Mul Baiyer electorate once the voters had tired of voting, and it was agreed/negotiated that all unused ballots must be used – an announcement was made on a loud hailer that “the parents of any children go to a candidate’s “finance officer” and be paid for their children to vote.

In another location in Jiwaka a candidate campaign manager informed an observer that he had had an exhausting week dispersing 90,000 kina cash to councillors in villages. The observer asked how he could be sure that the voters then voted for his candidate. He replied that this was always a risk and that was why they had groups of young men hanging around the polling place checking how people had voted.

Resistance

On a positive note is this comment from Nawae Open, which suggests that despite the bribery, “The peoples biggest desire is to vote, they are now not worried about receiving bribes they just want to cast their vote. They now realize voting a leader is very important.”
Furthermore, it seems that many polling officials refused bribes: *Ijivitari Open: There was no evidence of intimidation/ bribing of polling place officials. They were honest in polling, they do things in public witnessing by (TI) observers and scrutineers of the candidates.*

It is also heartening that despite the dangers involved and the possible later retribution, polling staff will sometimes stand up to the abuse as this observer noted: *Goroka Open: “People were not voting according to their names and many people double voted. Scrutineers and supporters of different candidates controlled and threatened voters to cast their votes to their candidates. As a result, old people feared them and decided not to cast their votes. Due to all the above comments, the presiding officials stopped the voting at 4:20pm and there were about 200 ballot papers remaining.”*

The results of the Voter Expectation Survey regarding bribes show us that PNG citizens clearly recognize the consequences of bribery on election integrity with 85% strongly agreeing or agreeing that the results are meaningless if bribery is commonly occurring. This is good to see as it shows that there is a strong feeling that this type of behaviour should not be accepted.

While we may say that the bribe takers or requesters are to blame, it is people aspiring to be law makers that are offering and giving bribes or intimidating voters. Therefore to protect the integrity of the parliament more must be done to prosecute guilty candidates.

**Campaign posters in or near the polling place**

As can be seen in the following picture at times polling officials seemed oblivious of the rules and the possible effects of allowing candidates or their supporters to erect posters in or near the polling place on election day. While not bribery or intimidation, this is undue influence. This is clearly something that must be addressed in the poll worker training. The photo here shows how blatantly this was this sometimes done. It should be noted that many other candidates in the same electorate were doing the same thing.

**The Secret Ballot**

In 2012, over the entire country it seems that we are still not doing very well in this regard. In 36% of the observations there was either never or only sometimes secret voting.

Internationally, one of the most important factors
determining whether elections are free and fair is whether there is a secret ballot. In past elections, and in this election, this basic right had not been adequately provided for or protected.

*Goroka Open:* “There was no secret voting because people were crowding around the cardboard voting compartment, watching others casting their vote.”

If we break this down by region we can see that in the Highlands in nearly 60% of the polling places observations there was never or only sometimes secret voting. There is a significant difference between the Highlands and the next poorest performing region which is Momase.

It is worth considering here what is meant by secret voting – and we cannot be sure it was always interpreted in the same way. Clearly, it cannot simply the provision of the voting compartment, as sometimes people crowded around them because there were not enough voting compartments – thus destroying any privacy. Also we need to consider if it is secret, so the voter votes in secret – but then the ballot box guard takes the ballot looks at it and then deposits it into the box.

Clearly, if our democratic traditions are to be protected the secrecy of the ballot must be far better dealt with by the PNGEC. Just simply moving polling under cover and having more voting compartments would greatly help. While some have argued that bloc voting and family voting in PNG is culturally appropriate – it is the view of TIPNG that this cannot be tolerated. If the PNGEC believes it cannot run an election in an electorate without ensuring the secret ballot, then it is possibly better that no election take place immediately and that representation should be withheld.

It is worth reflecting on the comments of a group of women voters in a village in Western Highlands in 2007, who were denied the right to vote in person and who asked our observer “Our country has independent for 30 years. When will we as women have the right to vote?”

It is our belief that if somehow a free and fair referendum on this issue could be arranged – women especially would vote to ensure the secret ballot remained in place. Our Voter Expectation Survey shows that a 80% of participants believe that without the secret vote the election results have little validity.

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9 This has been suggested by others. See Pg 8, Ladley, A., Holtved O. & Kantha S. ‘REALIGNING ELECTORAL INCENTIVES’
The following comments on polling in 2012 also show that voters do value the secret vote.

Ialibu Pangia: “There was a bit of argument among supporters about the idea of having voters in straight lines according to their first preference voting - but that did not eventuate as most voters disagreed.”

Kerowagi Open: “There was considerable shouting about why people should be able to vote for who they like. And it was reported to me that candidates had being giving bribes.”

The Rights of Women Voters

Over the whole country only 71% of the observations showed that women could mostly or always vote without interference. The remaining 29% of observations reported that women could only sometimes or never vote without interference. While some have commented that the democratic rights of women were better respected in this election - and this is quite possibly true - it is still unacceptable that the right of women to vote without interference is still being abused.

We can see that the highest level of interference occurred in the Highlands region followed Momase and the Islands region. The figures indicate that the population is becoming more sensitized to the democratic rights of women. However, there is still a long way to go as the elections on this statistic alone can be challenged as not being free or fair.

Moresby North East: “.... the women were told and forced to vote for the candidate their husband preferred.”

Huon Gulf Open: Some woman voters went in with candidate names on their hand or paper to vote for. Some woman just went and stood and their helping hand just voted for them without the woman pointing to the candidates she wanted.

Separate facilities for women

Over the whole country 151 out of 554 observations reported that the polling places were set up like this. If we break this down by region we can see that this was predominantly done in Highlands (47%) and in Southern (37%). We assume the low level in the Islands and Momase was because there was less perceived need for separation and yet the Islands region was not the region with lowest level of interference.

In the Kundiawa Gembogl bye election in 2010 the polling places had been set up so that there were separate cardboard voting compartments and entrances to the polling places for women so as to better protect the rights of women to vote.

Unfortunately, just because they were set up in this way it did not mean that women’s rights were well protected. Observers noted that sometimes where there were separate lines but manipulations occurred as men were given more chances to vote or that the same women
were voting over and over again. However, the PNGEC deserves commendation for trying to address this problem. It is our view that more fundamental things such as redesigning the ballot paper and ensuring that there is strong enforcement of the laws – must be implemented as part of the protection of the democratic rights of women in PNG can be properly addressed.

**Bribery & Intimidation of Polling Officials**

Unfortunately, an unacceptable number of observers saw evidence of this. Clearly, the integrity of the elections to a great extent relies on the polling staff being able to act without being influenced. Stories such as this are very worrying, if correct.

**Oro Province:** “The Returning Officers were flown over to Port Moresby by the two winning candidates for the open seats, we do not know for what reason.”

**Kerowagi Open:** “More of the polling officials accept bribes in cash or in kind food stuff from candidate’s supporters.”

**Ijivitari Open:** “The Electoral Officers worked at the polling place had something to do with the particular candidate and did not do their job because they were already being bribed with money..”

Overall in 61 of observations the observers believed they saw evidence that the polling staff were being bribed. In another 23 observations there were reports of intimidation of polling staff. This distribution can perhaps be explained in that intimidation is far easier to detect and so less likely to occur actually at the polling place.

If we break this down by region we can see that the fewest observations of this occurred in Momase and the most in the Highlands with bribery being dominant except perhaps in Southern region.

Note that this sampled whether they had evidence of bribery or intimidation of polling officials. It would appear likely that there was a higher incidence of bribery and intimidation for which no evidence was seen. However, it must also be said that we do not know much about the quality of the evidence or if it would comply with the rules of evidence in a court. For example, this comment does not necessarily indicate that they were trying to subvert the process.

**Madang Open:** “I saw 3 men came up to the polling officials and gave them buai, lime and mustard.”

However, when we see first preference votes already being filled in on ballots handed out to voters as this comment indicates,

**Mendi Open:** This polling place was base vote of a candidate and they (the tribesmen plus the candidate) killed pigs and bought food stuff like, buai, smoke, coca cola etc. So the presiding officer signed the ballots for the candidate putting in the 1st preference and second preferences.”
– there must be suspicion that polling staff were involved or at least did not object. While it is often difficult for polling staff who live in that community to resist such pressures – it is very disappointing that Returning Officers and their assistants and the security forces are not more prominent in countering such behaviour, as it is hardly hidden from view.

Despite these problems we do have comments indicating that at times polling staff did stand up against such abuse. Mendi Open: “At both these polling places I had observed that many men freely aggressively spoke, trying hard to deprive the right of people and the polling officials. But they did complete their task. The security personnel were with no arms and even respect the votes of the people. There was no violence. Every aspect was transparent except that the left over ballot papers were signed under the consent of the leaders....”

A partial answer to this problem probably lies in this observer comment from New Ireland about appointment of polling officials: “One thing I would like to say is next time the people from Namatanai will come to Kavieng Electorate and people of Namatanai open will come to Kavieng open during the polling period, to avoid wantok system and bribes...”

The views of our participants in our Voter Expectations Survey clearly show they do not tolerate this kind of behaviour.

Partiality of Polling Officials

While we asked about the perceived partiality of the polling staff, we do not believe this was always understood as the results do not tally with the comments made on these questions. Therefore we have not tried to quantify this.

Many of the comments showed that the officials were working in a fair way: Moresby North West: “I observed two significant things that made the election at Rainbow great. 1) The presiding officer and polling officials did an excellent job and were honest with their duties. 2) The polling area and set-up was very good. There was a secure fence area and it could be observed at all angles.”

– although some pictures showing polling officials handling ballots that have already been prefilled are very worrying indeed. This is especially concerning, as in some cases they were clearly linked to candidates, as in the case where a presiding officer was alleged to be a candidate’s campaign manager.

10 If interested to further examine this please contact TIPNG
Ivijitari Open: “Before polling even started voters in the polling place, argued and called for the presiding officer to be removed as he was known to be the campaign manager to a candidate.”

It also seems that although bribery of officials took place it did not always lead to obvious bias. Kundiawa Gembo: “although the officials were being bribed, they maintained their duty.”

**Presence & Partiality of Security Officials**

Overall, observers commented that the presence of security officials made a positive contribution to the electoral process. Again while we asked about the perceived partiality of the security staff, the quantifiable results do not tally with the comments made on this topic.

However, we need to know that close to 100% of both polling and security officials are impartial if we are to have sufficient confidence in the police and security forces to act without interfering. Of course equally important is for the police to act when they see others acting impartially. An observer in Anglimp South Waghi reported that he was ordered out of a polling place by a candidate, who was inside the polling place, in the full view of the police, who did and said nothing. However, the real challenge is to someday run polling places where a far lower level of security is needed.

It was very difficult to know if inappropriate behaviour by the police was necessarily a sign of deliberate partiality or just a lack of awareness of the consequences of what they were doing, or not doing. We have many pictures of police officers guarding ballot boxes and taking ballots from voters and checking them before they put them in the ballot box. However, while wrong, it is our view that this was probably done in ignorance and with no intention of subverting the wishes of the voter – although it must be acknowledged that given the force the police and security forces sometimes used it must have been intimidating. We do want to take this opportunity to commend the police commissioner for promptly removing or punishing some police officers who acted outside the law.

It is very clear that the boundaries of responsibility are not clear to the lower ranks of the police and security forces. This is hardly surprising when the polling staff themselves are not well trained and often acting in breach of the law. In the Highlands particularly, we have reports that indicate the police and security forces often encouraged polling places to close before the legal time and then stood by while the polling staff filled out the remaining ballots.

More worrying are comments such as this: Goroka Open: “The polling officials and security officials were over powered, meaning they were continuously controlled by voters and scrutineers at the polling place. Most often the people screamed at the polling official telling them what to do while the police officers
stood by and watched, because they were bribed with smokes and betel-nuts. This resulted in the process becoming very hard to control and so the polling officials cannot control the voters and scrutineers.”

A point that needs to be made here is that it is not usually the bulk of the voting population who are causing the problem – but usually a small group of young men and other supporters.

There needs to be clearer rules regarding the presence of the police inside the polling place, especially where they are carrying firearms. While it might be possible to justify the occasional presence of an armed officer in overcrowded and tense polling places in the Highlands, that have a history of violence – it is totally inappropriate for armed officers to be located by default inside polling places in regions where the threat is low or non-existent.

Furthermore, there needs to be careful consideration of the messages implied when police officers use sticks and dogs to control voters – who are trying to exercise their legal right. It is very clear there is a great deal of fear amongst voters of the security forces and it is not just that people fear being caught breaking the law. This may mean that some people, especially women and the elderly, fear coming to the polling place, as they may be caught up in crowd control violence. Much of this violence in the highlands especially, simply stems from the knowledge that the rolls are inaccurate, will not be used and that all ballots will be used and that people can usually vote as often as they like, given the inconsistent use and checking of ink.

In many places, and in the Highlands especially, voters feared the security personnel, particularly the army and police with dogs. In one polling place in Kundiawa Gembogl in Chimbu, an observer noted that while unarmed police were present the police and polling staff barely kept the crowd under control. However when people even heard the sound of a vehicle that might contain the army, they quickly started behaving themselves.

However, sometimes it seems as if the security forces were excessive in their zeal elsewhere, as this comment shows. Moresby North East: “Police fired four shots at Hanubada after wrapping up the polling. What for?? they just freaked people out with their childish inconsiderate behaviour”

In Central Province in one location an observer recorded that a soldier was standing in the entrance to a polling place with a gun and in another the soldier was standing just behind people voting. This seems something of an over-reaction. Is it really necessary for armed personnel to be located inside a polling place? If it is, we doubt whether the elections should be occurring at that time in those communities, as it probably would not even be safe to vote, if the threat is so strong that it requires an armed policeman to be inside the polling place. In other words, if the threat is so high the election in that place, it should be delayed.

Despite these problems we do want to acknowledge that the security forces greatly assisted the election process and also helped observers on a number of occasions. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank the police commissioner for his cooperation.

**Election Violence & Intimidation**

Unacceptable levels of violence occurred during the 2012 election, before during and after polling.

Election violence and threats of violence obviously have the potential to greatly interfere with the elections and the extent to which they are free or fair. Although, we did not have any specific questions on this, we did see comments on this.
While many stated that the violence was less than expected in 2012 it is the view of TIPNG that it is very difficult to make such a judgement and anyway even if violence has declined unacceptable levels of violence are still occurring before during and after the polling. Not only does this inevitably and adversely influence the election results, it also results in significant loss of life and damage to property.

**Pre-Polling Violence**

Reports in the media such as the one below indicate that people have good reason to fear the campaign period.

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**Deaths Allegedly Attributed To PNG Elections Violence Increasing**

*Police report 18 deaths during pre-election period in Highlands* By Johnny Poiya

PORT MORESBY, Papua New Guinea (PNG Post-Courier, June 14, 2012) – The death toll in the Highlands from election-related violence is rising and, according to the police, all deaths involve the use of guns.

In the latest shooting incident, a teacher went berserk in an argument with his wife and brother over his favorite candidate.

According to Parapia Ramane, a villager from Kagua-Erave electorate, the suspect, opened fire in public and shot two men on Tuesday afternoon.

He said though the shooting may seem accidental, both the victims were supporters of another candidate whom the suspect had publicly opposed.

The latest deaths bring to 19 the total number of people killed over the last three weeks over election-related issues in the Highlands. The number of deaths, injuries and destruction to property is expected to increase as the seven mountain provinces go to the polls after June 23.

Though police reports disclose 18 deaths officially, our Mt. Hagen office has received unconfirmed reports of further atrocities by candidates, current MPs and their supporters in remote parts of the region.

Eastern Highlands has seen the worst killing in the pre-polling period so far with the killing of 10 people in the Lufa District last week. Another, two people were killed in each of the Chimbu, Jiwaka, Southern Highlands and Enga provinces.

In Chimbu Province, two men were shot dead in separate incidents in the Kerowagi and Chuave districts last week. Both men were reportedly returning from political gatherings when ambushed and murdered.

[PIR editor’s note: *The National* reports that at least one man was shot dead by police in the Southern Highlands at a political rally, and two others were shot in the Kagua district on Tuesday. The first man was described as acting “intoxicated” and allegedly threatened rally-goers with a bush knife. The other two men reportedly died from wounds suffered during a drive-by shooting; the vehicle involved was allegedly transporting a candidate for the Kagua seat.]

In the Lufa killings, 10 people from two warring factions were killed following conflicts instigated by candidates in the area. The Kuruka Nega and Hira tribes are tribal enemies and their hostilities came to a head last week over political differences and a fight broke out, resulting in the deaths. A further 50 were injured. In a scary scenario, victims were killed by high-powered assault rifles, causing one senior policeman to express his concern about the widespread use of illegal firearms by villagers in the region.

Chimbu Provincial Police Commander Augustine Wampe said, “It’s scary that people are no longer using spears, arrows and bush knives. The use of guns has become rampant and it’s a very serious and worrying problem now.” MPs and candidates in the region, who are contesting to become leaders, are known to have stockpiled illegal firearms to use in the election.

Former National Gaming Control Board boss Simon Sanangke is to appear in Mount Hagen District Court today, charged with firearm-related offences. He is challenging Petroleum and Energy Minister William Duma for the Hagen Open seat. Police charged Sanangke from Ogelbeng village with two counts of being in possession of firearms and ammunition yesterday morning. Highlands Commander, Assistant Commissioner Teddy Tei, said Sanangke was released on K3,000 [US$1,441] bail and will appear in court for mention this morning.

Police conducted a dawn raid on Monday, confiscating two firearms and ammunition in Sanangke’s house.
Post-Election Violence

While most international long term observers tend to report on the enrolment, campaign, polling and stop after the counting periods – in Papua New Guinea we cannot make a reasonable statement about whether elections are free and fair without considering post-election violence, which may occur for months after the elections. As we had only short term observers we have monitored post-election violence through monitoring newspaper reports.

As of the time of writing some three months after the return of writs – we have seen many reports in the newspapers of post-election violence. Obviously, most of these are follow ups of other stories. However, we can be sure that many stories are simply not reported. Therefore it is not possible to make a comparison and say that there was any more or less post-election violence than in previous elections.

The article below demonstrates that the threat alone of post-election violence will influence voter behaviour at the elections. Clearly, if elections are to have any meaning, there needs to be ways to create strong disincentives for this kind of behaviour. Obviously, perpetrators of violence need to be prosecuted and not just ignored or subject to random state reaction that does not lead to arrest and court action.

Post-Election Violence Mounting In PNG Highlands Province

Groups aligned with political candidates ’declared war’

By Zachery Per

PORT MORESBY, Papua New Guinea (The National, August 1, 2012) – Post-election violence is erupting in parts of Chimbu and Eastern Highlands, resulting in killings and destruction of property in Papua New Guinea.

Tens of thousands of kina worth of property in Chimbu and Eastern Highlands have been destroyed after the declaration of election results this week.

In Chimbu, a young man had his right hand chopped off, while in Eastern Highlands three people were confirmed dead with homes and property destroyed, including a vehicle owned by a losing candidate.

Provincial police commander Supt Augustine Wampe confirmed tribal fights in Kerowagi and Gumine districts.

Outgoing Kerowagi MP GumaWau’s Dagle tribes declared war against their neighbouring Kamaneku tribe in Kerowagi after blaming them for not supporting Wau.

Wau’s faction attacked clan groups whom they alleged did not vote for him by torching their homes and chasing them away.

Wampe said several thousands of kina worth of property, including houses, coffee trees, domesticated animals and food gardens were destroyed. Eyewitnesses from the area who did not want to be named confirmed the use of high-powered guns in the tribal fight. Wampe said a young man lost his right arm in an attack by supporters of a losing candidate in the Gena area of Kerowagi district.

The victim was identified as Miugle Yer, from the Gena Komainde clan. He was attacked by supporters of a candidate, who was eliminated in the final five counts.

Siune mobilised his Gena Komainde-Goglkane clansmen and hunted for supporters of rival candidates from Gena. “They confronted Yer (victim) and chopped his right arm off. He was rushed to Kundiawa General Hospital. “The severed right arm was still in the village, we buried it and are monitoring his condition in the hospital,” an eyewitness who refused to be named said.

It is not only polling period behaviour that is influenced by post-election violence, or losing candidates and their supporters who cause the problems. In Gumine supporters of one winning candidate allegedly blockaded the one road for several weeks, so that people belonging to other clans who had supported a competing candidate who was disputing the results, were unable to access services in Kundiawa. This kind of behaviour will clearly be very damaging to the integrity of the election as it is a direct challenge to the disincentives set up by the state to deal with electoral fraud.
Was Polling Place Management & Electoral Administration of Sufficient Quality?

While some polling place and electoral commission staff showed great dedication and tried to consistently apply the correct procedures, on too many occasions others did not.

Motsamai in writing about conflict in elections points out “Lack of public confidence in the electoral machinery and government institutions as a whole sows the seeds of mistrust and discontent.”

Clearly then, the performance of the electoral commission and its staff will have a large impact on the way candidates, their supporters and voters react. The observations show us that electoral administration and management leave much to be desired and that the PNGEC has much of the resources and desire to do much better.

Distance to Polling Place

The purpose of this questions was to determine if the polling places were placed in reasonable locations in relation to where most people lived.

We can see that 32% of observations reported that all or many voters had to walk or travel for more than an hour. This is a significant percentage given that an hours walk could effectively disenfranchise the elderly, the sick and pregnant women. This suggests that either there is a need for more polling places or that many are poorly located. This is especially important as the margins by which many candidates won were often small – and so the location of the polling place could be critical.

If we break this down by region we can see that the biggest problems lie in the Highlands and Momase regions, which seems odd given that these are probably have the higher densities of population.

Observers in NCD commented that as the polling localities and the letters that corresponded to them were not made clear – voters complained that they had to go from polling place to polling place to find the place they were supposed to vote in.

One observer in Anglimp South Waghi, Jiwaka found that as a result of combining polling places for security reasons– some voters were having to walk for considerably more than an hour. Furthermore, they had to walk through what had become hostile territory as there were

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candidates from villages through which they had to transit. This is a clear example of where the polling place location could easily have helped determine the result of the election. The observer noted that there were very few elderly people present.

In another location in Chimbu, where the polling place was located on the top of a high hill in a small village, and where most people claimed they lived down in a valley, (estimated to be 400 metres below and at least five kilometres away) the people who had walked up the hill accepted it as that was “what happens in elections”.

The following comment also makes it clear that while sometimes it may be unavoidable – it is critical that once people arrive they can be dealt with efficiently and that the roll must be accurate. *North Fly Open: The voters have to walk 14 kilometres to Diabi (3-4 hours) to vote. It wasn’t fair as it was hard for the voters to get there quickly to vote in time. This is because they were scattered and stayed in the bush. Therefore it was very hard to gather them to come in one place due to rain, flood and road conditions. Also the polling officials couldn’t move around easily due to flood and weather conditions that’s why many didn’t vote.”*

Where there were late starts the PNGEC also created additional problems and possibly disenfranchised people who lived even a moderate distance away from the polling place:

*Kundiawa Gembogl: “Voters are very much concerned with late start and the delays caused by movement of materials and polling officials and feared that most of their ballot papers would be returned if time catches up with them. Delay of time had caused some voters not to vote because of distance between polling place and their home”*

Another problem that became apparent from some comments was that polling places were moved from their gazetted places, or they were moved or originally placed within the base vote areas of some candidates. Given the huge number of candidates this last issue is to an extent unavoidable. However, there does need to be more advance notification of the sighting of each polling place.

**Opening & Closing Times**

Most polling places did open within a few hours of 8am. 162 out of 590 observations\(^\text{12}\) (27%) recorded that the polling place opened at 8.00 am and a further 23% by 9.00am. 14.5% only opened after 12.00 am. These opening times are a little misleading as there were occasions where the polling place opened, but lacked essentials such as

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\(^\text{12}\)Note that the number of observations for any one question will vary depending on whether the observer filled the question in and whether they were present during the event.
candidate posters. Furthermore this data reflects the time started – not the day started. (this is discussed later.)

If we break this down by region we can see that while the Islands region had early starts, the largest number of starts in the Southern region occurred after 10am and in the Highlands after 11am. (Some of the late starts may of course been on the second day of polling, but that is hardly an excuse.) The question needs to be asked why the start was so late in the Highlands where many of the polling places observed were on the Highlands highway. Was it poor logistical planning by the PNGEC or the security forces?

Reading through the written comments made by observers it can be seen that the main reasons for delays in opening were that either materials had not been sorted and organized and delivered or that allowances had not been paid. In some regions bad weather also caused delays.

In many cases, polling was delayed by a day or even several days with often no clear statement coming from the returning officers. Some observers found that the polling officials themselves did not know when the materials would arrive and when the polling would actually start. It was particularly concerning that very little effort seemed to be made to notify the public that the times had changed. In Western Highlands the national radio station were replaying old and incorrect messages as to the start times. (This raises the question as to whether the PNGEC had plan for and control over the messages about polling days.)

Inevitably, many voters must have lost the chance to vote as they had waited for the designated day and then when polling did not occur, they went to their gardens etc.

It is unacceptable and shows a lack of credibility when the polling staff are not even sure where the polling place is

![By Region: Time Polling Place Opened by Region](image)

At this polling place in Madang town the polling started late and then because the polling official insisted on calling out the names, by the end of the day there was considerable anger as many people had waited all day and in the end they could not vote until the following day.

![Photo of polling place](image)

The slowness was not helped by the polling staff not setting up enough cardboard voting compartments. Although a shortage of them as this photo taken at the same polling place as in the photo above shows was not the problem.
supposed to be located – the materials are wrongly sorted so that polling places have the wrong candidate posters (multiple occasions Chimbu). Equally poor was the situation in Kundiawa Gembogl, where a helicopter delivery was allegedly made to a place where in fact a road, albeit in poor condition, existed. Given that 27 million kina was spent on helicopter hire (mostly for the Highlands) this seems excessive.

Clearly, then the PNGEC needs to greatly improve its logistics, as even in Port Moresby these problems were occurring.

Other Observer Comments:

Dei Open: “The polling took 2 days. It started late the first day at 15:30 and ended 18:00. Resumed at 8:00 the next day and ended at 12 noon.”

Oro Province: “The polling was delayed by three days and then on the day it did start, it did not begin until 2.00pm, even in Popondetta town. There it ended at 18:00, and most voters were sent home to come back and vote the next day.”

Sinasina Yongomugl Open: “The polling officials arrived late at the polling place therefore the people did not have enough good time to cast their votes.”

North Fly Open: “The polling teams were not given enough time to travel due to remoteness, short time frame, funds released too late and they were told to wait for seven days and no more than that. Because there won’t be accommodation for them they do not turn up on time. therefore they were working very lazily.”

Sometimes polling places started late for peculiar reasons as this comment shows; Hagen Open: “People took away the window glasses for the security personals two ten seater Land Cruiser vehicles the night before the polling, and they delayed the polling until the stolen items costs were contributed and met.”

Closing

The data for this question was intended to determine if the polling places closed at the legal time and what the total hours of polling actually were. However, it was very difficult to determine this because of the numerous start delays which often led to polling in a single polling place being conducted over two days where only one day was planned for. Furthermore, in many cases observers were not present when the polling place closed.

We can see that while most polling places closed on time, nearly 25% had closed by 4 pm. What is much more worrying is that the comments show that in some places, the Highlands especially, the polling places were only open for three or four hours because of a late start and an early close.

Given that observers commented that it often took some time for each voter to vote, especially if they were semi-literate or did not understand how to use the ballot paper – and given that in
many places there were more than 400 voters on the roll, it can only be concluded that short cuts were being taken to process all these voters in such a short time.

While it may make sense to reduce the legal hours of voting from 8.00am - 6.00pm to 8.00 am – 5.00pm to avoid darkness,... it can never be acceptable for a polling place to remain open for less than the legal hours. During this time even if there are no ballots left, a polling place is normally kept open especially when it is unclear whether all voters have voted. Otherwise we are encouraging polling staff to rush voters and the process in general.

Part of the problem here lies in the amount of discretion given to presiding officers by the law. Some seemed to subvert the intention of the law so that they can close when the ballots are all used – regardless of how they are being used. Observer comments show that in too many polling places proper legal processes were simply abandoned (no use of common roll, no identification of voters etc.) and as a consequence voting was over in a few hours. This is in contrast to polling places in other areas where despite using most of the legal hours, polling places struggled to process all registered voters as in the comment below.

Wewak Open: “Voting was exceeding slow with 183 people voting in 8 1/2 hours of polling. Poll workers were also very slow to find names on the roll and voters took an average of 3-5 minutes to vote, mostly due to ballot paper design which requires the voter to write the number or name of the candidate.”

Madang Open: “The polling commenced at 8:00 but due to the voters standing in the long lines, that is why it took them right through to 17:00 for them to close.”

This of course creates a feedback loop, where voters waiting, then push for a faster process.

Madang Open: “The people were complaining to move quickly as its getting dark they want vote quickly.”

In some polling places it should be noted that officials went out of their way to facilitate voting: Alatou Open: “Polling was supposed to end at 6pm, but due to so many people still in line it was extended. Pregnant women and elderly people were allowed to come forward to vote and not stand in line.”

Given what we experienced in the Highlands and sometimes elsewhere, when sometimes hundreds of voters (probably more correctly ballot papers) were put through in several hours, it is TIPNG’s view, that rather than extending polling hours, and/or short cutting procedures the PNGEC needs to commit to ensuring lawful practices and processes are followed. To achieve this as well as more training and a review of procedures and forms – including the ballot paper design, the PNGEC will probably have to set a limit of no more than 300 or possibly 400 voters on the electoral roll in each polling place. This will certainly have to be done if the current voting arrangements are kept in place.

Clearly, without doing something about this the message we are sending to our people is that proper process is unimportant and that only the election result matters. It is for this reason that we must question the view of some that custom and tradition are driving this when our own integrity building institution is sending such a contrary message about proper process.

**Ballot Box Shown As Being Empty**

For the large majority (74%) of observations, the box was shown as being empty before polling commenced. However, this does not mean that in 26% there was necessarily any kind of fraud. Where one day polling was supposed to be conducted, (all the highlands, NCD and Manus) we would expect that the box would always be shown as empty. (This is what the regional breakdown shows us.) However, due to frequent delays and late starts polling in these places the ballot box may have been used over two days.
In many non-Highlands provinces the ballot boxes were used for more than one polling place and so excepting for the first day the ballot box could not have been seen as empty, on the first day of polling. This probably explains why compliance was higher on the Highlands than elsewhere.

The PNGEC is switching to much lighter and transparent ballot boxes\(^\text{13}\). (Nesting boxes that sit inside each other could also be purchased so space is saved.) Therefore the question must be asked as to why each polling place cannot now have its own ballot box. Surely the current system goes against international norms and just encourages distrust, as some observers noted.

Wewak Open: “There are some arguments and disputes over the same ballot box being used in another polling area. It should be put aside and the new one should be used. Because earlier on at Surumba, there was an incident. A polling officer from another polling area under the influence of liquor arrived at Suambokau polling area demanded that the ballot box be given to him, for transportation to the police station in town, at the closure of the polling at 18:00 Hours.

Ballot Box Seals Applied

Although, virtually all (98%) of observations record that the seals were being applied to the boxes and the seals numbers called out, (without any significant regional variation) observers noted other issues regarding seals. In Madang an observer noted that all throughout the day that only two seals were applied when during polling one should be applied to each of the four sides of the ballot box.

Perhaps more worrying still is the very high number of ballot boxes seen, which had at least some of the seals applied the wrong way around. This means that the seals could be removed and reapplied, without detection. This was picked up both by a few of our observers and an international observer.

\(^{13}\)Evidently, it has 30,000 of these plastic boxes, however, they were ordered late and as a result some could not be deployed during the 2012 elections.
While this issue was addressed in the poll worker training materials, it probably needed more emphasis and moreover it seems that in many cases the training was either omitted, or that inadequate time was given.

Observers often commented that the seals broke. It is highly likely that if a seal was applied the wrong way around it would not lock and so poll workers pulled harder and thus broke them. Another possibility is that old stock was issued. The PNGEC did have some old seals which had probably been greatly weakened. If these were used then they would have broken very easily.

It would be useful for the PNGEC to investigate if seals can purchased that can only be used the correct way around.

**Provision of Polling Materials & Personnel**

Here we were checking to see if the polling places had sufficient materials. However, with this data we cannot separate out whether they had the material on hand, or whether they used what they had as intended. Most comments suggest that where they had the materials they used it, and so any problems were caused by lack of delivery of materials.

**a) Finger Marking Ink**

Only 86% of the observations recorded that the polling place observed had adequate supplies of ink, with little variation between the regions. If this is to be a credible system of preventing double voting then 86% is not high enough to build trust. The extent of the use of the ink, rather than its supply, is discussed later as this is a much greater problem.
b) Cardboard Voting Compartments

It is the view of TIPNG that it is unacceptable that in 9% of polling places there were inadequate numbers of cardboard voting compartments14, given the importance of the secrecy of the ballot. Note that there was almost no regional difference.

Furthermore, we are concerned that observers were too generous here given the very slow polling and the very few reports and photos that show polling places where a single voter can go into a polling compartment alone. The two photos below show sharply contrasting situations. What is remarkable is that in Central Province the actual numbers on the voter list was actually lower and the polling place was some way from a main road and yet this was one of few places where the provision of the polling compartments seemed adequate.

The polling place in Jiwaka in the photo after that, is right next to the highlands highway. This is clearly a problem of poor logistics and the setting of a very low standard by the staff concerned. We can hardly blame the voter when such poor provision is made. It should also be noted that with such a complex voting system it is hardly surprising that voting takes so long and so there needs to be much greater provision for cardboard voting compartments and the tables that they need to be set up on.

14 Although on the folding cardboard voting booth it says “election booth” it was felt that the word booth could be confused with the whole polling place. In the glossary of the 2012 polling official training guide we have called these “voting compartments” – and so we have used that term in this report. See glossary in appendices.
c) **Ballot papers**

Overall, 96% of observations showed that there was an adequate supply of ballots. The highest provision was in the Islands region and the lowest was in the Highlands. Initially, we thought that the observers would determine adequacy by comparing the number on the roll with the number of ballots in the election journal. However, it is much more likely that observers simply looked to see if the numbers of voters wanting to vote was the same or less than the number of ballots.

However, given that in the Highlands many observers reported that the electoral roll was not used – and because often people kept voting until the ballots were finished – it is hard to conclude whether the data means anything at all for that region.

We are unclear as to the reasons and legality of the printing of distribution of ballot papers without any electorate name as was done in Nawae Open and possibly elsewhere. This seems an extraordinary compromise fraught with risk.
d) Candidate Posters

74% of observations reported that there were enough candidate posters. The question simply asked whether, yes or no, the polling place had enough candidate posters. The issue of course is what does “enough” mean. In the case of candidate posters we would have expected one regional and one open candidates poster for every voting compartment and ideally one or two more placed for people in the queues to look at. Therefore if there was only one voting compartment for 400 or more people, as was seen in some locations – an observer might then comment two candidate posters was enough…. it clearly was not. (1 per 100 voters seems more appropriate.

Furthermore, in places where there were over 40 candidates for both the regional and open seats two posters would simply not fit in the voting compartment. (See picture to right from Oro.)

While it is difficult to measure exactly what effect this had on voters, certainly, not having a candidate poster or even enough candidate posters, must have made voters very vulnerable to allowing someone else to vote for them, and not abide by their choices, especially if they were illiterate, semi-literate or otherwise disabled.

Madang Open: “There were posters there but because they were illiterate they cannot read and vote.”

Therefore what the data shows us is could be very worrying if the observers are being generous. If they recorded that there were enough posters, but “enough” just means there was one candidate poster outside, so that the voters had to remember the number or how to write the name of the candidate, this is obviously grossly inadequate. The fact that candidates in many cases supplied voters with pieces of paper with these numbers might suggest that they predicted that this would occur.

Kavieng Open: “There were not enough posters there for the voters to clearly see the candidates they wanted to vote for, and then vote for them, for both Regional & Open as well.”

Moresby North West “Only 2 cardboard voting compartments 1 for men and 1 for women and the candidates posters put in the compartments. No other candidate posters.”

A further problem is that posters are basically unsuitable in an outdoor environment as this comment from Kavieng Open shows. “In the second polling place there were no candidate posters because of the rain.” Not only are they damaged by water…. There is often no place to hang them as the same observer noted. “Candidate posters were pinned around a coconut tree, but they are supposed to be properly pinned to a board.”
Another problem often noted is that people get confused about which ballot paper to use. This problem is again linked to the use of candidate posters.

Nawae Open: “There were too many informal papers so I think that we must use two secret box to vote- one for open and one for regional. Because there was only one secret box and in that box it’s got two posters so when the voter walked up with two ballot papers in his hand, it was very confusing as to who they are going to vote for. So many people voted for the open candidate using the regional ballot paper and regional one using the open paper.”

Redesigning the ballot paper with candidate photos so no candidate poster is necessary would solve this. However, that cannot be done until the number of candidates drops substantially, and or the PNGEC accepts the costs associated with much larger ballot papers which can incorporate the names and photos of all candidates.

Another problem was poor logistics and sorting as this comment shows:
Kundiawa Gembogl: “1)The posters for the Regional Candidates were not given, instead they got the one for Karamui/Nomane. 2)No ink used. 3)No cardboard voting compartments were put up. 4)Time of arrival at 13:30 to commence election was not good.”

In the same electorate, which ran the elections several days later than scheduled, an observer was rung by an another observer and told that the wrong candidate posters had been supplied. He then went to get the posters from the PNGEC office in Kundiawa, which was closed with only a deaf and dumb guard outside. Calls to the returning officer and others went unanswered. Finally, the observer drove up to the polling place and encouraged the presiding officers from different polling places nearby to share what posters they had, which they did willingly.

Polling Places Outside

Most polling places are set up outside as communities are concerned that buildings such as schools or churches will be damaged. Clearly, this is an unsatisfactory way to set up a polling place, if the secrecy of voting is to be protected and polling materials are to be protected from the elements. However, where there are no suitable buildings or where the real threat of damage to buildings exists this is unlikely to change, despite the fact that polling outdoors seems very unusual even in most third world countries.
Bulolo Open: “But polling officers still need many more things like chairs and tables. During the time for polling. .... They also need canvas for sun and rain.”

Kavieng Open: “Polling was suspended for four hours due to heavy rain and resumes at 11:00”

e) Polling Staff
The highest level of dissatisfaction was in the Highlands where just over 20% of observations claimed there was an inadequate number of staff. Overall 93% of observations showed that there was an adequate number of polling staff at each polling place.

Despite fairly good overall figures, we did find in the comments that some observers were concerned about the quality of preparedness of the polling staff. Some commented that polling staff seemed completely unprepared as this observer from Mendi Open commented: “I believe that the polling officials and Presiding Officers didn’t know much about their roles in the polling areas and the procedures. Therefore they need to be trained and facilitated properly to carry out elections.”

Ijivitari Open: “The presiding officer admitted when asked, that the polling officials were not properly trained to carryout polling properly.”

Moresby North East: “People questioned if officials were trained because they weren't doing/following simple processes like identifying voters.”

TIPNG had been involved in preparing training materials for the election commission, but three problems occurred which probably all but cancelled out this work.
1) The actual training period was it seems, compressed from three days to one day.
2) The cascade delivery model, whereby the assistant returning officers would deliver the training, did not work as many chose to revert to the traditional model of lecturing to large groups, and thus ignored the training module and its interactive approach.
2) The election journal (which the training was designed around) was in some cases not supplied until after the election.

f) Security Personnel
A large majority (84%) of observations showed that there were adequate numbers of security personnel. Interestingly, the region with the lowest level of
satisfaction was Momase (30%) followed by Southern.

**Provision of Ballot Boxes**

Although we did not have any questions about the new ballot boxes there were comments about them. Some observers commented that the ballot boxes could easily be smashed. This sounds very unlikely unless they were made from a brittle plastic.

A few observers commented that they were simply not strong enough to sustain a knife attack. It is our view that if good quality plastic boxes are used and polling is only conducted when it is safe for voters and polling staff then this should not be a problem.

Furthermore, a metal box can be destroyed by a determined person and certainly the old practise of throwing the keys to padlocks into a river is hardly sufficient.

*Rabaul Open*: “The rain fell before the polling starts and officials moved the things to a safer place, because people were so curious about the ballot box. Everything were alright and in order except that the people were so concerned that the ballot box was a plastic type and can be easily broken.”

As noted earlier there is also some concern about the practice of using a ballot box for more than one polling place.

**Scrutineer Access at Polling Places**

A large percentage, (83%) of observations report that scrutineers always or mostly had adequate access in the polling place. The lowest level of access was noted in the Highlands region and the best level of access was noted in Islands region.

Clearly, trust in the process will decline rapidly if the scrutineers cannot get adequate access and so even if only 17% of observations show that scrutineers never or only sometimes cannot get access, this is unacceptable.

However, given the number of candidates it is not surprising that polling officials often do not allow scrutineers inside the polling place. Clearly, not much can be done about this unless the number of candidates drops below about 15 candidates per electorate.

Perhaps not surprisingly, some of the observer comments indicate that scrutineers were sometimes kept at too great a distance and therefore could not see what was happening.
North Fly Open: “Complaints from the scrutineers that there were too much space between the polling officials and scrutineers and so they said they don't know what was going on.”

Rai Coast Open: “Truly unfair because the scrutineers were not able to stand in the polling place and monitor the voting process.”

One of the more extreme examples is shown in the photo below, where the polling place was up on a veranda and the scrutineers were sitting under a tree some 10 metres away. (The observer did not think this was done deliberately, as there was not space on the veranda and so he thought that the scrutineers were sitting at this distance to be in the shade.)

It seems as if there is little understanding of the role of scrutineer and its importance by voters, polling officials and sometimes the scrutineers themselves. While often major abuses occurred of voters’ rights the scrutineers seem oblivious to these breaches of the law. Clearly, this is an area that the PNGEC in cooperation with the political parties can cooperate more.

Rather than seeing the scrutineers as a problem to be tolerated, with training, especially if the number of candidates declines, we believe the presence of well-trained scrutineers can help bring about free and fair elections throughout PNG.

When Can People Come Up to Vote?

The PNG electoral laws and procedures, as in most countries, require that the next person waiting in a queue come to the polling official, is identified and if they are on the roll and have not already voted, be given a ballot paper. In reality, assuming the electoral roll is in use and there is some kind of identification, this does not seem to happen consistently in Papua New Guinea with only 64% of observations reporting that people can vote when they are ready. (Note that the 64% refers only to where the roll was used.)

Instead polling officials, if they use the roll, call out the name of next person on the roll and those in the line wait for that person to be found and go to the polling officer. This created problems itself as observers noted,

Rai Coast Open: “Polling officials confused voters, when reading the names in the roll, because they mis-pronounced the names.”

When did voters come up to the polling clerk?

![Pie chart showing 64% of individuals voted when ready, 36% voted in order of roll.](image)

Voters in this polling place in Kairuku-Hiri voted in the order that they arrived.
Kimbe Urban Open: “Because names were called following the common roll voters had to sit down or stand outside of the polling area and wait for their names to be called. As a result, people were gathering close to the polling officials table and waiting for their names to be called.”

Wewak Open: First they called out the names, but most of the time we waited and nobody came up. Then they tried, to follow the proper procedures... But then they had too many people in the polling place at once because voting was so slow and the scrutineers complained, so they went back to calling out the names. They relied on the scrutineers objections for identification. There was no real questioning that I saw.”

Another problem this approach creates is that people do not know when they are going to vote and so large groups mill about waiting to be called. (This no doubt does nothing to dispel tension.) People who have often arrived early, end up waiting all day. Some get tired and leave – and then their name gets called out. Having voter photo/ID cards, and/or photos in the voter list will greatly improve this situation and should mean that the calling out of names practise can be dropped.

While the family order roll was praised by some observers, its effectiveness in the Highlands must be questioned on two grounds. Firstly, in many places the use of the common roll was abandoned or not even tried. Secondly, its use is likely to prevent people being able to come up to vote as and when they are available, as is international practise, rather than coming when their names are called.

It is also concerning that in some places the number of people, who did not belong to any family grouping, seemed to form a very large proportion of those on the roll for that ward.

**Voter Identification**

The data shows us that only in 44% of the observations the polling staff did consistently identify the voter before checking the name off the roll and allowing the voter to proceed. However, we cannot be sure that this means that they identified the voter by questioning as stated in the PNGEC procedural manuals, whereby the poll clerk asks a series of questions of each voter to determine who they are. It might have simply be on the basis of knowing the person by sight, or where the poll workers, not being from the area, relied on scrutineers identifying voters. This is hardly satisfactory and will result in accusations of bias, as this comment shows:
Boera, Kairuku – Hiri Open: “They did not use the roll properly to check identity. There was a girl who came up and was allowed to vote, but later they realised that there was someone with the same name but a different date of birth.

While some observers commented that polling officials should come from the village or that the “village recorder” (if they exist) should be included on the team, others say that polling officials should come from other areas so as to reduce affinity with a candidate.

However the use of unofficial staff also caused distrust. Rai Coast Open: “There were two people, not polling officials, at the gate of the polling place, helping polling officials to check and read the names of the voters, which I think is not fair.”

This situation is unlikely to change unless voters are given some kind of ID card with a photo and or if the voter list has a photo of each voter. Ideally, both the voter ID card and the electoral roll would contain several biometric features.

Alarmingly 22% of the observations show that no identification check was carried out at all and a further 21% show it was only sometimes done. Clearly, the critically important “one person, one vote” principle can easily be flouted as the comments below attest.

North Waghi. “Two voter lines representing 2 different clans. Ballot papers were allocated roughly equally between both clans. The common roll was used sporadically flexibly... As a prompter. Perhaps only whilst we were there. Polling was closed when double voting was decided to be obvious by presiding officer and head cop. Party men were trying to enforce whom would be allowed to go into vote, but were opposed by police when police felt like it.”

Asaro Open: “Like many other polling places in Eastern Highlands Province, the common roll has no use in this election. Anyone can vote anytime to use up all the ballot papers. People (voters) came five by five at a time from respective clans to cast their votes and the common roll was a useless document in the polling place I observed.”

A major issue is not so much if the voters were identified but whether the roll was used at all. As has been recorded in the past elections and by observers from other groups – sometimes names are marked off but there is no linkage with identification. Dei Open: “.... Although they used the ward roll, any male just went in and voted using any name for men and they voted more than once and the underage as well were voting.”

It seems as if the quality of the common roll was also used as a justification to abandon formal identification procedures: Hagen Open: “People voted using the other people’s names, because of the poor updating of the common roll by the Electoral Commission.”

Kimbe Open: “People cannot vote because polling officials didn’t check names on common roll properly although they...
had their names on the common roll before. Polling officials were seen to be rushing through the roll book.”

Goroka Open: “Since most of the staff and students were not enlisted on the common roll, it made the job of the polling officials harder; therefore, we had to just line up and vote instead of following the common roll. Consequently many did not vote.”

Hagen Open: “The names called on the common roll were from another council wards, so they just went in on one name and voted.”

Use of Ink

Most (83%) of the observations reported that ink was being applied always. Only 2% reported that it was never applied. Given that it is really only trust building if it is universally applied, it is worrying that in 15% of places it was only sometimes or mostly applied. This occurred more often in the Highlands region and least often in Islands region. The lower level of application in the Highlands region probably can be explained by the fact that there was more double voting there.

However, a key problem with inking was not so much whether it was being applied and how consistently, but whether the polling officials were checking if voters in the queue already had ink on their fingers. Although we did not ask a question about this… some observers commented that this was consistently not being done. Some saw people just present a finger, on one hand but another inked finger was folded back on the same hand.

Another problem noted was that often the ink was being applied without any proper identification of the voter or reference to the roll…. so the ink at best, was just eliminating those who had not voted regardless of who they were or where they came from.

In the written comments some observers noted that the ink could quite easily be removed with a combination of bleach and lemon. It can also be scraped off fairly effectively and especially, if the ink is put on over some kind of barrier such as pig fat. Some voters chose even simpler methods to double vote: Moresby North East: “The ink was used to mark voters, but was removed by those voters, who came later and voted again. Some even used band aids to cover their fingers, but polling officials still let them vote.”

So although there is a high degree of ink usage, its value can be questioned. The Voter Expectations Survey however show that voters still have a fairly high degree of trust in ink with 80% agreeing or strongly agreeing that the use of ink was important.
Signing of Ballot Papers

It is positive that overall 87% of observations reported that presiding officers were signing each ballot paper just before giving it to the voter, rather than pre-signing all or large groups of the ballots. Another 7% were doing this correctly most of the time. There was little regional variation. This is an important security measure, because if implemented, it prevents people stealing ballots and using them. If we break down the data by region we can see that in the Highlands there was a lower level of compliance with this requirement.

In some cases it should be accepted that this was done not for purposes of fraud but simply to speed up the process. However, that does not justify the action. Given that the training was probably very weak in many areas we can also assume that the reasoning behind the requirement to only sign just before giving the ballot to a voter was glossed over or omitted.

Ballot Account Form

The purpose of this question and the next two was to determine if the election journal and especially the ballot account form was being used. The election journal is a compilation of many old and some new forms. Perhaps the most important form, the ballot account form, is designed to collect more information about the movement of ballots and thus would add more accountability to the polling process.

Most of the 361 observations where this question was answered, 318 (88%) stated that the ballot account form was filled in. So procedures were ignored in 12% of cases.

Where the observations do not provide a response (201 cases), the written comments suggest this was because either the observers were not there during the close of the polling place, or the form was not filled in at the polling place as intended. Instead, sometimes, it was filled in later after polling had been completed and the electoral materials had been taken to a police station as this comment indicates: Ijivitari Open: “The day of polling the Presiding officer refused to balance up at the polling site and said it would be done in the office.”

It seems that at the end of the polling day, procedures are cut short and the day is wrapped up as quickly as possible.

Recording of Unused Ballots

On reflection we should have changed this question to “Were there any unused ballots and if so how many, and what happened to them?” In no cases in the Highlands region did observers report there were any ballots actually left unused by the end of polling.
This was because any unused ballots were generally distributed amongst those remaining or the polling staff themselves filled them out, which is clearly illegal.

In no case did any observer witness any unused ballots being burnt as has been reported in past elections.

**Sealing of Ballot Boxes**

While the vast majority of observations (97%) stated that the boxes were adequately sealed after the closing of the polling place, many were unaware that the seals were sometimes being applied the wrong way around. This meant the seals could easily be removed and reapplied without detection. This is something that will have to be addressed in training of polling officials but also that of observers and scrutineers.

**Transport of Materials After Polling**

Overall, 97% of observations recorded that adequately secure arrangements were made for the transport of the ballot boxes at the end of polling. This seemed well organized even if at times a little rushed. This was mostly organized and carried out by the security services with control being largely being in their hands.

**The Counting Process**

Very few observers were able to observe the count and mostly those that did only observed, at best, one or two days at the beginning of the count. Therefore the actual data is less meaningful than the written comments. Therefore, this report summarizes the key findings of those written comments. However, the questions did provide a good structure to guide the observation of the count.

Generally, as was found by the Commonwealth Observer Group the counting process was probably one of the better run parts of the elections, with the transmission of the results and the broadcasting of the results being excellent considering how slowly this was done previously.

Some issues do need commenting on in relation to the count process itself.

It was disappointing that the election journals were not being presented alongside the ballot box. This is an
important accountability mechanism that was largely ignored. Of particular importance is for the presiding officer to announce the number of used and unused ballots as was supposed to be recorded in the ballot account form.

While the counting centres seem to have been adequately provided for, we noted that, despite the very large sums spent on this election, in some places (Kimininga) beer cartons were used as trays to sort the ballots. (One scrutineer did ask if these were purchased full or not!)

Despite the availability of computers, in some places at least, the counting staff were not using a form 66 in an excel template and so were manually adding up the totals and making mistakes.

We wonder why in some places all the regional ballots, for all electorates in a region, were not counted in one place. Instead in Kimininga, for each open electorate counting area, they were also counting the regional ballots collected in their electorate.

Observers also noted that scrutineers faced some problems during the count as they were told not to complain and that instead they should direct any complaints to the court of disputed returns. This hardly seems satisfactory. The PNGEC should at least consider away that scrutineers can deposit written complaints.

While the count seems to have gone reasonably well the same observer, who stayed for the duration of the count in Oro noted that there were problems during the night, especially when it came to exclusions: “I observed that the counting officials made many mistakes during night times between the hours 12am to 4am when they were sleepy so I suggest the night count could stop at 12am midnight.”

There were many complaints in the media and by observers about the disruption caused due to teachers assisting with the count.

Oro Province: “I took note of many parents and the public who were not happy with teachers taking part in counting and missing out in teaching. This is a great concern to parents and children alike and some teachers were threatened by frustrated parents. Some of the public also complained of Public servants taking part in election process they have said that the electoral commission should engage the youths who have finished grade 10, 11 and 12 to take part in the further election.”
However, some observers believe that teachers should be involved in the elections and there seems to be little alternative to involving teachers as they are often the ones with the skills to do the job.

What was the Response to Observers?

Access and Cooperation from Polling Officials and Security Officials

Overall the access and cooperation given to TIPNG observers was good with only 19% of observations reporting that observers, never or only sometimes, had cooperation or access issues. This did not vary greatly by region. The better figures for Southern region can possibly be explained by its proximity to Port Moresby.

While 19% is high, we think that given that polling staff and candidate supporters were mostly unaware of our role, this not too bad a percentage, especially given that we only had one observer actually ejected from a polling place. The comments indicate that in most places polling staff and voters welcomed us, probably because they felt that the worst excesses would be avoided while we were there. (See later for discussion of responses to observer presence.)

Some observers reported that presiding officers were unwilling to give out information on the number of ballots received, because they said this information was “confidential”. This may have been due to the presiding officers being poorly trained – and a lack of confidence that they were carrying out procedures correctly.

Another problem which we need to comment on was that often TIPNG observers had far better access than the scrutineers. Scrutineer access is often highly restricted – simply as a result of there being so many of them – because there are so many candidates. So while the observers were often located inside the polling place and free to move around, the scrutineers were often forced to sit outside with very limited ability to see what was going on.

This leads to a situation where the observers can inadvertently, become “the eyes” and so a proxy for the scrutineers, which is to be avoided if we are to retain our impartiality.

Generally, the observers had no problems with the police but occasionally problems did occur as describe earlier in Anglimp South Waghi and this comment indicates: Rigo Open: “Observers
were restricted access to the polling area by Police & Soldiers presence there. They didn’t allow entry and Kundu 2 also were not allowed access to interview voters as they felt it would cause problems.”

**Response to Observer Presence**

Overall the response to observers was very positive.

Observers could tick as many of the options as were appropriate. For 249 observations the observers reported that no comment was made to them about their role by others in the polling place. In 245 observations, the observer believed that the polling was more orderly as a consequence of their being there, whereas in only 16 observations did their presence make things worse.

*Huon Gulf Open:* “As an observer every process in that polling is free, everything ran smoothly, but the problem is there was a candidate contesting in Morobe regional who was from that village. Everyone wanted to vote for him. When they found out that their names were not on the common roll book, they wanted to fight with the polling officials. However, when I stood up and spoke to them they all agreed and stopped, and we close the polling smoothly.”

The written comments indicate that voters greatly appreciated their presence and that it brought more order to the process as these comments indicate.

“... our presence has had a big impact on the orderly running of the election in ward 1 and for most of Talasea electorate”

*Central Bouganville:* “…we were first met with a lot of suspicion and negativity, but many people clapped on our presence and our stand and our fight against corruption.”

*Nawae Open:* “Voters expressed gratitude to observers for their presence, because of controversial 2007 election.”

In one case in Mul Baiyer a presiding officer made an announcement that “everyone must behave now as TIPNG was watching”. It must be added however, that both candidate supporters and voters did not seem the least bit deterred in ensuring that their candidate won as this comment illustrates:

*Moresby North East:* “Bribers not understanding TIPNG role, two approached me asking if they could pay me money to flirt with the polling official so they could have a talk after slipping them some money.”

However, observer comments indicate that scrutineers, campaign managers and the occasional candidate also thanked observers for being there.

*Ialibu Pangia* “In here the young people and the men took over the polling place and obstructed the duties of the security personals and made lines of their own and went to vote, and the officials were very nervous about the disgruntled crowds. The polling officials appreciated the presence of the observers there.”
The Voter Expectations Survey also showed that participants see the value in observation with 91% agreeing or strongly agreeing that the election commission cannot work alone and so citizens must be involved in improving the quality of elections. 93% of participants believe that NGOs should have a role in observation and these observations should be used to help the PNGEC decide if the elections in an electorate are free and fair and comply with PNG’s laws. This would probably be very difficult to do... but certainly it does indicate that there is considerable dissatisfaction with the current arrangements and the extent to which our elections are free and fair.

*Oro: “My role of Observer was very important for the community and the country as a whole. People now realise the role of the TI-PNG in our country.....”*
Section Three: Discussion

In our view the elections were not free and fair, by international standards. While a great range of behaviours was observed we believe there is vast room for improvement.

The observer data, while positive in places, shows us that the elections were often chaotically run and at times dangerous for innocent participants. At the same time, voters seemed extremely tolerant of the wrongdoing and mistakes made. As a result many of the comments suggest a high degree of dissatisfaction, not so much with those staff in the polling places, but more with the PNGEC, the candidates and their supporters.

Furthermore, the TIPNG Voter Expectations Survey showed us that 91% of respondents thought that if elections were seriously flawed with procedural errors and influence, throughout an electorate, that the PNGEC should be ordering re-poll. 59% of participants thought it was better not to have a representative than to have one improperly elected.

Therefore this section draws conclusions from the observation data, and also discusses the causes and possible solutions relating to issues wider than polling day procedures. As such it draws upon TIPNG’s value position of proper process, accountability and transparency.

Why are we failing to deliver free and fair elections?

Clearly, no one cause can be found. Below we have discussed some of the causes that seem most discussed and seem most likely causes of this failure.

Traditional Culture

We do not believe culture is the root cause. However, it can be part of the solution. Some may believe that the predominant causes of electoral process failure lie with traditional culture. However, a case can probably be made that while traditional culture and power networks create strong incentives for anti-democratic behaviour, they also can facilitate democratic behaviour where the common good is promoted.

Even if some aspects of some cultures are incompatible with the conduct of democratic elections, culture is so difficult to change, especially given that change will only occur over the long term. Furthermore, the PNGEC, outside its limited voter education, or any punitive measures it can bring to bear, is unlikely to be able to change cultural attitudes.
TIPNG’s Corruption Perception Survey found that 69.3% of people surveyed believe that “the behaviour of leaders is separate from our culture”. It is true that the way we interpret “separate” is quite subjective and it is also unknown as to whether such a high proportion would align corrupt behaviour by voters with cultural practices. However, this data does indicate that the general public challenges the idea that culture is the predominant factor.

86.9% of participants in the same survey agreed that “I know that if I accept gifts from candidates, or money that is stolen from government, it will make the lives of my children much worse in many years to come”. If then culture is to blame then people’s behaviour is at sharp odds from how they understand the world. This conflict is surely a key message to exploit.

Furthermore, 81.3% of people agreed that “A good leader puts the needs of PNG ahead of his own family and haus line”. This also suggests that people do know that there are supposed to be some national responsibilities, which may in fact conflict with cultural obligations. In TIPNG’s experience however, we find that people and even some new members of parliament are very unclear about what these national responsibilities actually are. This is clearly going to be an important target message for any community and school based civic education.

It is also worth reflecting on the fact that there are other societies that are strongly tribalized and which have achieved better outcomes in terms of the quality of electoral processes.

As a consequence we have tried to focus on interventions that do not necessarily rely a change in culture.

**Lack of Consistent Application of the Rule of Law**

While there are stories of instant justice being meted out on polling day, there are too few stories, given the incidence of malpractice, of arrests and prosecutions being made. Given the scale of the problem, the heavy reliance on the court of disputed returns seems unwise. There seems very little if any follow up or deterrence when the law is ignored and yet the potential damage to our democracy is clear by this observer comment.

_Moresby North West: “From an interview a voter said this election has been dominated by bribery and people don’t care how they vote.”_

We believe the consistent imposition of the rule of law over the rule of man, is one of the most important factors that lead to long term changes in citizen behaviour. Therefore it is the insistence on the application of the electoral laws and procedures that will probably bring about the change in attitudes and behaviour that are necessary. The PNGEC has a critical role in setting the standard. Sir Julius Chan’s recent comments that elections cannot be a “free for all” bear out that something is not right.15

Motsamai in writing about conflict in elections points out “Lack of public confidence in the electoral machinery and government institutions as a whole sows the seeds of mistrust and discontent.”16 Therefore we should ask what incentives for misbehaviour exist within those electoral mechanisms, over which we can have some control.

Although the threat of widespread and serious electoral violence seems to have been averted this raises the question as what reasons candidates have to use or threaten to use violence. It can be argued that it occurs primarily because voters and candidates and their supporters are

attempting to rebalance what they see as a skewed playing field, where people who break the law go largely unpunished. Therefore while there is a need for on-going security presence, more emphasis needs to go onto:

- punishing wrongdoers through prosecution in the courts. Especially candidates and their supporters who prior to election day manipulate voters, polling officials and security personnel. *(The police are commended for arresting the former speaker for allegedly trying to manipulate the process by paying a candidate to stand aside. Let us now hope this turns into a successful prosecution and that the police charge many other candidates who appear break the law.)*

- acknowledging those who report misdoings and those who do follow the rules.

- ensure that candidates their supporters and polling officials and security officials are aware of the correct procedures and the basic principles behind basic democratic rights.

- ensure that the logistics are in place so polling staff can implement the elections as the law implies.

- rather than just accept that procedures in the law are not applied, either insist on their use or change them in law

The energy of candidates and their supporters, because of modified incentives, then might be directed more towards ensuring the playing field is level, through checking that the proper processes are followed and having a contest of ideas. Currently, with virtually no complaints process and only weak follow up to law breaking, it is hardly surprising that candidates focus on other activities. They are acting quite rationally in response to the incentives and disincentives they receive…. as do the voters.

A few election postponements or elections being declared failed in an electorate, due to improper processes and laws not being applied, could have sent a very strong message, and certainly there was ample evidence to do this.

**Late funding**

For this election blame has again (as in 2007) been put on the late receipt of funding from government. While this must inevitably have had a serious impact, it is our view that if the situation was so dire that a credible election could not be delivered – then the electoral commissioner should have advised the government that the election could have not been run by the proposed date. At the very least the commissioner should have called the Electoral Advisory Committee and advised it of the issues and likely consequences and compromises required. While this might seem unrealistic in the political environment after the August 2011 events – the cost to election integrity seems to have been very high. What is particularly frustrating is that the PNGEC continually kept announcing that it was prepared17.

However, if any further review is to be conducted of the elections we do think that the impact of late funding must be looked at – and if as we expect it did cause many problems the government will need to ensure that the same situation is not repeated.

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During the same review we would also expect to see a careful check of the actual expenditure and the prioritization of spending. While it is accepted that costs will rise during the election period, and that elections are expensive – when we see in an observer report allegations that funds were wasted on expensive accommodation and workshops – the late funding seems less of a problem.

**Compressed Time Lines**

The compression of timelines, no doubt partly attributable to delays in funding, contributed to chaotic election preparations. In the final six weeks before the elections the PNGEC was trying to achieve more tasks than it could achieve if the quality that was needed was to be retained. This was especially the case given the complex logistics that are in part due to the poor transport and communications infrastructure in PNG.

We believe that there were many critical tasks that could have been done at little or no cost and certainly less cost in the years preceding the election. An obvious example is the review of forms and procedures.

As it was not only did the compression of timelines mean that activities were conducted at the peak cost periods, it also meant especially at a local level that election managers were having to implement a wide range of resource demanding tasks all at the same time.

Therefore the question needs to be asked – which of the many tasks could be implemented at an earlier stage. One of the key areas which should be examined in this regard is the training of polling staff. (See later for recommendations on this.)

Furthermore, we need to know if the planning and budgeting was of a standard over the whole electoral cycle that could easily be communicated to government so they could see that funding needed to be given on time.

We assume that a calendar of events with costs and resource requirements attached, along with estimates in time, resources and money for the costs of any delays, if incurred, was prepared.

**Management Ability**

Many of the complaints made by observers are the same as found in the PNGEC’s own survey after the 2007 election when 90% of PNGEC headquarters staff “alluded to the need for better planning and coordination of all facets of the delivery process ....”

Although, poor management contributed to the chaotic arrangements, it is not that likely that the problem lies solely or even mainly with a lack of management ability. However, there are no doubt improvements that could be made to the management processes within the PNGEC.

Therefore a strong emphasis on training in, and the application of Western management culture is unlikely to be all that effective in changing corporate culture and the running of the elections in PNG and especially if it is not combined with a strong technical reform agenda.

Regardless of how much training is given, election officials face enormous pressures to comply with both local and national political and cultural agendas. At the local level it is unrealistic to think that local officials could alone always remove ghost names from a roll, or insist on a secret vote, without there being a very strong and possibly life threatening reaction from the

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18 Pg 46, Electoral Survey Report, INA, 2007
candidates and his or her supporters. This especially the case if this work is left late in the cycle and no biometric roll is used. Therefore mechanisms to ensure voting secrecy and accuracy of the role cannot rely solely on local level government.

**The Effect of the Modern Political Dynamic**

The electoral environment both locally and nationally is probably shaped by the incentives created by modern political and economic dynamics. In other words, the existing laws and policies can unintentionally encourage people to behave in ways that are damaging to democratic culture.

To understand what is driving the destructive behaviour we see, we should probably be examining the incentives created for candidates behaviour by factors such as the resource based extractive economy, the District Support Initiative Programme (DSIP), the fundamental misunderstanding of the role of MPs, and the practise of governments seemingly so often paying compensation. While we are not saying these things are necessarily all bad, they do have a powerful influence on the political dynamics. The potentially illicitly gained rewards of being elected, seem to encourage large numbers of people with the wrong motivations to stand. Furthermore, when they stand their energies seem to be focussed on winning in a way that leads to the elections becoming a contest of might and manipulation, rather than a contest of ideas. It is for this reason that in our most important recommendations we have focussed on processes and structures that build protection for individuals from influence and incentivise more democratic behaviour.

**Technical Design Issues**

Part of the reason we are failing to deliver free and fair elections lies in technical design issues. A very good example is the design of the ballot paper, as it has many consequences for whether the elections are free and fair. While the current design results from a desire to save costs and simplify logistics, it encourages many behaviours that are deeply undemocratic. Most prominent is the lack of secret voting and the manipulation that often occurs as a consequence.

*Why is this manipulation occurring?*

It must in part be a consequence of a ballot paper design which must be one of the most complex anywhere in the world, with voters having to read a poster and then transfer the candidates name or number to a ballot where they need to put that number or name alongside a preference number. They have to this three times for the open seat ballot and three times more for the regional seat. As a consequence a very high percentage of eligible voters will require assistance.

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19 This ballot design was chosen so as to keep the ballot paper small, given the large number of candidates and the high costs of transport.
(If anyone reading this has doubts as to how difficult it is for illiterate voters they should attempt to vote using the modified candidate poster and ballot paper in the appendices.)

While TIPNG applauds the PNGEC’s efforts to include disabled voters, it needs to be recognized that the greatest disability amongst the population is illiteracy. The literacy rate is 56.2%\(^{20}\) and possibly dropping – and probably much lower amongst women in rural areas. The current ballot paper design is inappropriate as this observer in Angoram noted: “Ballot papers should be made easy for the illiterates, So that they can vote freely without helpers.”

Moresby North East: Relatives were forced to vote for people who were unable to vote because they were illiterate without the illiterate person choosing their candidates. This happens mainly on the settlement area.

Rai Coast Open: Scrutineers at the entrance were sending under age voters to vote for the scrutineers’ candidates when the actual voter on the list was illiterate and so does not know what he or she was doing.

One observer in New Ireland noted: “....there had been many informal ballot papers found in the counting process, compared to all previous elections. This is the 3rd time to use the LPV system, in 2007 it was used 2 times, one in national election and the 2nd one in the LLG election. The commission had allocated funds for awareness of LPV voting system four months before the election and the outcome of the reports shown that there was no improvement that more informal ballot papers were found in the counting process period.”

Unless of course the PNGEC accepts the costs of a large ballot with photos and names of candidates, a review of the design of the ballot, and probably its redesign, must be a high priority. However, this will probably mean one or a combination of electoral system change or finding a way to equitably greatly reduce the number of candidates will have to occur.

The Voter Expectations Survey suggests that 66% ether agreed or strongly agreed that the current ballot paper results in a flawed election process and result.

Given the enormity of the task most voters face it is hardly surprising that so many people accede to pressure, or allow someone do it for them, without their actual candidate choice being expressed. This problem of course is made worse when as an observer in Moresby North West commented, “the election supervisor was constantly reminding voters to hurry up because they were ‘taking too long’”.

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\(^{20}\) [http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20120910/yutok05.htm](http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20120910/yutok05.htm)
A consequence of these challenges is that we all see it as “normal” for several people to be using a cardboard voting compartment at the same time, and as a consequence all secrecy is lost, as is any expectation that it should occur.

No amount of voter education will ever overcome these issues, which can lead to disenfranchisement on a massive scale.

**Where to from here?**

To have truly free and fair elections a wide range of changes will need to occur, and at least be considered.

**Compliance with the Rule of Law**

Illegality has marked the behaviour of many individuals during elections, particularly over the past 15 years. We have recorded evidence of criminal activity in distorting the election results and yet there is no action taken, election after election.

The starting point for any real change must be that the laws and regulations relating to elections are effectively enforced. It is more than clear that, at almost every point in the electoral process, laws are broken or simply ignored, with almost total impunity, by public officials, members of the disciplined forces and the general public. Together with the Electoral Commission, political contestants and society in general we need to find ways in which the elections can be administered so that the laws and proper procedures are consistently applied and followed – and where they are not there are suitably punitive consequences seen by the general public. This will probably best succeed where there are also clear positive incentives for obeying the law rather than focus on relying on force to make people fear breaking the law. However, this cannot be dealt with just on election day. Political contestants and polling staff need to be aware of the laws and procedures and if possible the reasoning behind them. It is essential that the general public be aware of the laws and regulations. It is essential that people know that failure to respect the law has serious consequences for candidates, officials and the people of the electorate concerned.

**Legal and Procedural Review**

There are some obvious areas in the electoral laws, such as when campaigning can occur, and campaign finance rules, that clearly need review. This review should extend to examining procedures and forms so as to check that they comply with the law, and better fit with international best practise. Ideally, an international elections law expert should be brought in to assist with this process. Perhaps one of the most important areas that needs looking at is whether there can be simpler alternatives for the design of the ballot paper.

More can be done to introduce more consistency with the terms used. For example, is it voting booth, voting compartment, secret box etc. Sometimes two terms will be used in law. To try to improve this, just before the elections, TIPNG helped the PNGEC develop a glossary of terms, and this should be reviewed and once decided upon, applied consistently.

Once this legal review has been completed, ideally the procedural manuals should be carefully checked and then after conducting simulations of polling and the associated logistics (possibly

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21 See appendices
also checking at a bye election) the manuals and supporting materials (flipcharts, posters, what if manuals etc.) will need to be revised.

Training of Poll Workers & Others

Training has not been prioritized by the PNGEC. The training department was disestablished in 2008 (despite the PNGEC’s own survey\textsuperscript{22} saying that more training was needed). Even now there are only two staff who are temporarily employed in a training role.

TIPNG had one of its staff work with the PNGEC to improve the quality of the training materials and to set up a cascade model of training whereby the Assistant Returning Officers delivered the training to poll workers. However, the training of poll workers was largely a failure due to the following factors:

1. The revision of the procedural manuals, which the training was based on, was started in late January 2012 and in the end still not in the right format. (It needed to be more in imperative procedural form and less of a narrative). Furthermore, they only ended up being a rough approximation of best and lawful practise.

2. There is often a significant discrepancy between what the laws and regulations say and what we promoted in training and what happened in reality. For example, voters were not always free to come up in the order they arrived and be identified as present using the electoral roll.

3. The training materials were based around the new election journal which was delivered very late – and in some cases after the election.

4. The actual training period was shorter than the three days the training materials were designed for. In some cases, the period was only two or even one day, and not full days at that.

5. The training group sizes were not under 35 as we had designed the training materials for. As a result the lecture format was mostly used, and thus it was far less effective.

Clearly, the training section needs to be re-established and adequately staffed and resourced. Ideally, a training/voter education officer needs to be appointed for each of the bigger provinces and perhaps shared between the smaller ones.

One of the first tasks of the training department should be to work with the operations section to recheck all procedures, forms and then revise the training materials accordingly. A key focus in undertaking this task should be to eliminate or finds ways to insist upon procedures that are currently being ignored on polling day.

Consideration needs to be given to the idea of the PNGEC linking up with an existing training agency and offering a diploma in election management. This course would be available to Grade 10 completers and above and would last for four days – covering electoral procedures and elements of voter education. This would be offered in the three years before the election – with just a half day refresher on any procedural changes in the week before the election. When recruitment of poll workers occurs, holders of this diploma would have priority.

\textsuperscript{22} Sec “14.2.3 PNGEC HQ – 70% highlighted the need for more training and better preparation”, pg. 40 Electoral Survey Report, INA, 2007
We also think that it would be very valuable to at least prepare some training modules on electoral procedures that candidates and political parties could use with scrutineers and another one for the security forces that could be used both at the army/correctional services/police training colleges and just prior to the elections.

Finally, we would like to see greater emphasis on and use made of the codes of conduct that we helped the PNGEC develop for contestants, poll workers and voters. (See in appendices.)

**Electoral Rolls**

The poor state of the electoral roll was one of the major issues raised by our observers as well as other observer missions. While there was inevitably some confusion with the census update – very clearly many people who had previously voted in a location and who had not moved were disenfranchised.

Therefore there are a wide range of improvements that can be made, some complex and some fairly simple. However, the greatest issue may not be exactly which technology, but rather the PNGEC capacity to implement change. For this reason it will be imperative that a high level of technical expertise and support be available and that a much higher level of accountability and progress evaluation be instituted.

Below are some other technical improvements which we believe are well worth considering.

1. Give unique codes (probably based around the National Statistical Office system) and have GPS coordinates for all localities used in the electoral roll. This would effectively give each voter an address. Localities, where possible would be based on schools clinics etc. All enrolled voter entries would be linked to these locality codes in the enrolment database.

2. Redesign the enrolment claim form 11 with a receipt. If a photo voter list is not fully introduced, as an interim measure, the PNGEC should consider giving all voters an enrolment receipt which gives the enrolment number, name, sex age, voter number, and locality name and code. Voters should be encouraged to bring this to the polling place and then instead of the polling clerk trying to find a name that is mumbled by the voter they would imply look up the number. If voters were in the wrong location the poll clerk could have a directory of localities which they could use to explain where the person is supposed to vote.

3. Prepare completely new rolls as there is clearly limited trust in what exists. Once completed, audits should be done and comparisons made with church records, bank records, and ward record books etc. While it is accepted that people frequently lose phones and sims, the mobile phone providers should be encouraged to register all sims with names and locations and use this also for data matching. Another clear way to reduce falsification is to cross check enrolment with head taxes where they are collected. However, it would not be appropriate to deny enrolment where the tax was not paid, especially as it is not universally collected.

4. Trial a Photo voter list with multiple biometric features at any upcoming bye election. Voters could be issued with an identity card that could also be used for and linked with other services (for example health records, pensions and any affiliation with landowner groups that receive any government compensation). This card would be presented at polling place for identification purposes. (Although it is debatable as to whether it would
need to be mandatory, there could be a fast lane for voters who show up with the card.) It could even be clipped each time a voter votes which would then allow for the finger ink to be abandoned.

Having a creditable roll using biometrics, even if it is not used at the polling place will certainly help as it will mean that many of the ghost names will be removed and the under and over enrolment problems as evidenced by our own and other observers should be greatly reduced.

5. Set up a system whereby when people enrol they give their mobile number (if they have one). Later they can send an SMS to a specific number set up by the PNGEC which would then automatically send a reply confirming that they are on the roll and give enrolment identity numbers. Later on in the electoral cycle voters could send an SMS and get back a message containing the site of the polling place with a locality description.

6. Review the current electoral boundaries once new rolls are prepared, so as to protect the principle of each vote being of the same value. This is not only to correct the very large disparities between the populations of electorates (allegedly over 100% in some cases) but also to review where single electorate boundaries encompass geographic areas with communities with greatly varying needs as is the case with the Kerema Open. The parliament for its part, needs to accept that change is greatly overdue and work with the commission to come up with an acceptable solution. To help ensure this is passed by parliament – there needs to be a campaign in the media so all stakeholders understand the issues created by disproportionate electorates so that they can lobby MPs.

7. Consider ways to have automatic invalidation of box or abandonment of polling where the common roll not used. Clearly, the acceptance of not using the roll does strongly encourage candidates and their supporters to attempt to manipulate access and the right to vote.

8. There is a need to ensure voters are not charged for viewing the roll and that they gain better access to it. As suggested previously there could also be public readings of the roll and ward councillors could be more actively encouraged to share the rolls at a ward level. To further promote this process – electronic copies of the rolls could be given freely to political parties.

9. We would like the PNGEC to consider the influence of the family order roll as it discourages first come first serve polling. If retained, integrity checks should be conducted for where number of non-family order names exceeds those of family order as these are probably ghost names.23

10. If there is no voter card we want the PNGEC to consider encouraging parties and candidates to give voter slips with voter name and roll line numbers. However, it would have to be made clear to the parties that the activity is to “get out the vote” 24 and that these slips cannot suggest who to vote for. As a safe guard the presiding officers could

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23 TIPNG observers assisted ESP in conducting its survey of the effectiveness of the family order roll project.
24 While some may argue that there is no need to get the vote out it can be argued there is still a need to get elderly and women to vote as some of the observers commented that they often don’t come to the polling places.
be requested to view these and even keep some copies to be submitted with the election journal.

Organization of Polling Places

The organization of the polling places often left much to be desired. We feel this was primarily due to poor logistics, a lack of clarity about the correct procedures, and far too much flexibility about the way they were implemented. The expectation that this would be, has only encouraged candidates to try to manipulate the situation.

After the roll is revised, there is a need to review the locations of all polling places. Once established they should set by latitude / longitude coordinates. (We understand that much of this work has already been done by the ACC.)

It is unsatisfactory, although in some cases unavoidable, that some polling places are located far from where most voters lived and seemed to be moved to places that advantaged candidates. Ideally, no polling place would be located more than say 4 km away from 50% of those on ward roll. There needs to be considerable advance publicity so people are aware of the polling locations – particularly in urban areas.

Ideally, a legal limit of 500 voters per polling place should be set, given that if proper polling procedures are in place polling is very slow. We also would like to see a review of the practise of combining polling places into one common area, where in fact people live some distance away. While it may mean that the security forces can be concentrated and that there is less need to walk polling materials into places without roads – the downside is that voters often have to walk considerable distances and possibly through hostile territory.

Hopefully, with the introduction of a biometric roll, the elections could be further staggered in some areas thus allowing for access to remoter areas as with a biometric roll multiple voting will be much harder. It is our belief that otherwise the consolidation of polling places might be leading to greater manipulation.

It is very difficult to deploy candidate and other posters outside as they often end up being pegged to strings or pinned to trees. To better protect the secrecy of the vote and individuals right to vote, polling in school and other buildings should be much more actively promoted by the PNGEC. Uncovered voting, which is open to the weather, with its secrecy problems and the greater chance of electoral materials being damaged, should be strongly discouraged.

In each polling place a minimum number of cardboard voting compartments per polling place should be set. This would be based on a formula which gives a cardboard voting compartment, for say every 150 voters on the common roll. The cardboard voting compartments need to be redesigned with how to vote information containing the information on the “How to Vote” poster. The polling places should be set out so that all voters gave the chance to see the new “How to Vote” poster while queuing to vote. Again its use was restricted due poor logistics (many polling places did not have a copy of this poster) - and the outside locations used.
To ensure the secrecy of the vote not only must the voting compartments be used but polling should be conducted inside buildings as it was in a small minority of places. Buildings do not need to be built of permanent materials but the do at a minimum need to give protection from the weather and have walls to prevent others from compromising the secrecy of the vote as the photo here demonstrates.

The PNGEC has plenty of the new and light plastic boxes. At a minimum we think every polling place should be supplied with a minimum requirement of one ballot box for each type of ballot. (One regional box and one box for the for open seats) Where the number of voters is low perhaps the purchase of some smaller boxes could be considered.

A ballot box should be used for one day only and then closed along with the journal for that polling place (Currently, in some locations one box is use over several days at different polling places.) If transport difficulties are envisaged perhaps smaller nesting boxes should be considered so that a smaller box can be transported inside a larger one.

**Continue to Examine Options for Electoral Reform**

Electoral system reform is an on-going process in many societies partly due to better solutions being found and partly because societies change. Furthermore, there are an almost infinite number of variations all of which create different incentives for parties, voters and candidates.

While the Limited Preferential Voting system is clearly better than the First Past the Post system we think it is useful to carry out a review of the electoral system. The purpose would be determine if the current system configuration is achieving its aims and what modifications may incentivise

- voters and candidates especially to follow the law and act in a way that will lead to free and fair elections and
- voters to begin to think more about national governance issues

Furthermore, changes in electoral systems can often lead to incentives or disincentives for candidates to stand.
Research clearly indicates that where there are strong social cleavages the rules very much influence voting behaviour. We therefore call upon the electoral commission and the general public to consider what modifications might lead to this.

The important point here is that there is a wide variety of electoral systems all of which create different incentives and disincentives. Clearly, the current system is not yet sending the right messages to voters and candidates and so discussions and review should be on-going.

**Complaints & Investigation Process**

Currently, there is no formal complaints process in the polling places, despite this being a fairly common practise elsewhere. This was no doubt done partially to avoid the deluge of paper work that might ensue. However, even if there were one, it is unclear how these complaints would be dealt with, other than by the court of disputed returns. (In fact complainants are advised to take any complaints to the court of disputed returns, which given the cost and complexity is unrealistic and any way may not be directly related to a dispute about a return.)

Ideally, a complaints process in the polling place would simply consist of scrutineers being able to lodge a written complaint with the presiding officer. The presiding officer would just receipt having accepted it – although they would not have to agree with its contents. (Receipt would be noted in the election journal.) Clearly, if a group of scrutineers did this it would incentivise the polling officials to follow correct procedures.

Furthermore, there is no clear body tasked within the PNGEC with investigating reports of electoral fraud or a process in place. (It seems solely left to the police.) There could be citizen initiated (not candidate initiated) complaints that are valid that might not even reach the bar set by the court of disputed returns (meaning a significant difference in the results if proof is found). Therefore we would suggest that an Investigation Unit be set up which reports directly to the commissioner and which must be made public. As well as reviewing complaints made at polling places the investigation unit would have a set of “red flags” which would trigger an investigation. These red flags could include such things as:

   a) No unused ballots recorded in election journal
   b) 100% first preference for a candidate in any one box but where in other boxes less than 5% of first preferences cast are for that candidate
   c) Accusations of oversupply of ballots
   d) Accusations of RO or ARO bias or hiring where there is a conflict of interest
   e) Accusations of non PNGEC staff grossly interfering with polling process

**Election Disputes**

Currently, there are a record number of electoral petitions each of which is heard by a single judge. To protect single judges on the court of disputed returns from political influence or harassment we would like to see that a panel of judges be used at least for the final decision.

**Electoral Violence Mitigation**

Should we have elections at any cost? Clearly, some of the least able are paying heavily for their democratic right and those of others. This raises the point that the PNGEC should be

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25 See Dickson E & Scheve K.
more prepared to delay and suspend elections in electorates where there is clear risk to the lives of voters and polling staff\textsuperscript{26}.

As pointed out earlier, TIPNG’s Voter Expectations Survey showed that 59% of participants agreed or strongly agreed that it is better to have no representative than to have one who is elected through an improper process.

The heavy reliance on the current strategy of out gunning candidates and their supporters, during the campaign and polling periods leaves communities very exposed after the elections and results in electoral processes that flout the conventions of free and fair elections.

Motsamai when writing about electoral conflict in the African sub-continent points out that “the tendency for last minute or ex post facto attention to conflict prevention is un-strategic and insufficient for managing the complex dynamics and causes of electoral conflict. Tools for preventing violence must be woven into each stage of the electoral cycle.”\textsuperscript{27}

As well as insisting on best practise, to avoid giving candidates the incentive to rebalance the electoral playing field, the PNGEC should try to implement a range of conflict mitigation and reduction strategies through the establishment of a conflict management unit within the PNGEC which would:

- Better understand the IFES Election Violence Emergency Response (EVER) mechanism and look at ways to apply it in the PNG context.\textsuperscript{28}
- Better understand and support the TIPNG Community Advocacy for Increased Election Integrity (CAIEI) project communities, and the activities it promoted\textsuperscript{29}
- Monitor and report on the actual cost in lives and property of election violence
- Identify hotspots and meet with intending candidates prior to the campaign period to:
  o reassert the relevant laws and regulations
  o working with the Registrar of Political Parties get agreement on and implement the code of conduct for candidates and political parties
  o provide mediation to alleviate tensions where conflict is imminent
- Work with communities and candidates in the post-election environment to reduce tensions.

\textbf{Voter & Civic Education}

As was clear in 2007, much on going public civic education is needed as well as the more traditional voter education, which deals with how the actual act of voting is carried out.

We believe that many of the attitudinal and control problems stem from widespread ignorance about:

1) the true role of members of parliament

2) the real value of the vote

\textsuperscript{26}See Ladley, Holtved & Kantha.
\textsuperscript{28}http://www.ifes.org/Content/Projects/Applied-Research-Center/Cross-Cutting/Election-Violence-Education-and-Resolution.aspx
\textsuperscript{29}While it is too early to declare the CAIEI project a success or not – there are certainly some very promising signs
3) the proper processes for elections.

**Governance Messages**

The 2011 TIPNG Corruption Perceptions Survey found that 62.8% of people agreed that “if I sell my vote, I still expect the elected leader to be accountable to me once he is elected, even though he has paid for my vote”. Therefore people believe that even bribe givers do have an on-going role to play. Perhaps what is more alarming is that 37.2% believe that once the bribe is given the elected MP NO longer has an obligation to represent them. We have seen this sentiment expressed in the CAIEI project where some communities thought that if their candidate did not win then they were NOT entitled to the services that the winning candidate might be able to bring. Clearly, there is a group of powerful messages relating to this that needs to be gotten out through public civic education, including:

1) The MP has an on-going responsibility to represent all voters regardless of whether they voted for him or her or not.

2) Citizens have a right to services because of the taxes they pay. That right is not necessarily linked to whom they voted for.

3) Citizens can work with MPs through a variety of mechanisms.

4) Citizens can make the MP accountable during the time he or she sits as well as at election time.

5) Their vote is worth more than 50 kina and a good MP can bring more than short term gain.

The same survey found that 53.3% of the people agreed that “If elected leaders are corrupt it is not the fault of the people who elect them”. This suggests that a small majority of people are still not linking their behaviour (especially vote selling) or the behaviour of others with the consequences. This too is clearly another message that needs to be got out through long term civic education, along with the idea that MPs are faced with the dilemma of meeting sometimes conflicting traditional and parliamentary obligations.

We saw the effectiveness of community based civic education focussed on key messages with our AUSAID funded “Understanding Corruption Through Drama Project” which had as one of its key messages that “Everybody Pays Taxes”. Once people, especially those in villages who were not aware of the GST component of products for sale in village stores, understood this – they wanted to know what was happening to those hard earned taxes.

**Encouraging a Focus on the Contest of Ideas**

In TIPNG’s 2010 election strategy document, describing interventions we wanted to make for the 2012 elections, we included support for civil society and the mass media for the promotion of political party debates and policy comparisons. This was rejected by some donors as being too “political”. 

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We still believe this is key if we are to switch the electoral contest from one of winning at all costs to a real contest of ideas. We believe this type of initiative should be supported for the 2017 elections but also for any bye elections that occur in the interim.

**Process Messages**

It is worth noting that many people in villages almost certainly do not have a “vision” of what orderly voting following proper process actually looks like. An obvious tactic therefore is to create one on video and make it available on broadcast television and DVD.

Our observer reports show us that there is still considerable need for voter education on how to use the current ballot paper and how to differentiate the open ballot from the regional one. This voter education should be available at the polling place – as for many that will be the only time they ever get to see it. Clearly, more on the line of the “How to Vote” poster is needed. However, our preference would also be for the ballot to be redesigned so that it is easy to use for illiterates. Even in this case, voter education would obviously be needed.

Another approach that should be explored is the development of a easy to read village elections booklet which could have photos or other graphic devices, showing what proper process looks like. This could be distributed through a wide variety of mechanisms including such as the TIPNG CAIEI project and schools.

**Timing**

It was our feeling that the funding for voter education was about a year too late and there was not enough inter agency cooperation to allow for effective communication of the messages. Civic education on governance messages especially, needs to be carried out over the long term, not just six months before the election, when all the votes are often committed already.

Therefore funding for voter education, even if it to just deal with the act of voting, needs to be available at the very least, 24 months before elections. Agencies would then conduct the bulk of voter education over a 21 month period, which largely stops in the three months prior to polling. Ideally, especially for the civic education type messages, we would start this even up to two years earlier. This means that planning for this work for 2017 should start very soon.

To have real impact, we need to see a similar level of message penetration as has been done with the HIVAids campaign. This would mean that some of the posters produced, for example, would need to be turned into video products and billboards. This is because the governance
messages that need to be communicated, are reasonably complex and mostly abstract. Consequently, they need to be viewed repeatedly and in different mediums and then discussed.

Certainly, the type of public and community based civic education that is required is a huge task, probably beyond any one agency. To be successful it will require an all government plus civil society approach.

While some might argue that it is not the role of the electoral commission to deal with “civic education” it is unclear which single other government departments might do it. Ideally, of course it would be something tackled across departments, with the PNGEC taking the lead.

TIPNG has civic education as one of its core goals because it believes that unless the public is clear about the basic ideas behind parliamentary democracy, voters will have a great deal of difficulty in making informed decisions when choosing representatives.

TIPNG has three projects all of which have civic education goals and all of which are in various stages of implementation.

- **The Community Advocacy for Increased Election Integrity Project (CAIEI)**
  
  *Its current funding is about to run out. This worked with communities that were interested to take the initiative themselves to implement any combination of fifty strategies to improve the integrity of elections in their own communities. The strategies included such things as organizing candidate forums and better providing for the secret ballot. A project description and first phase final report is available from our office. TIPNG in conjunction with OXFAM is designing a second phase, which it is envisaged, will expand the project role to helping communities better understand local government financing mechanisms and how communities can work effectively with their national parliament MP.*

- **The Open Parliament Project**
  
  *This project is about to start and will help track the work of MPs especially in relation to law making. A major objective here is to help people understand what it is that MPs are doing while in Port Moresby. A project description is available from our office.*

- **The Good Governance & Anti-Corruption Education (GGACE) Project Phase 2**
  
  *This project will start in February 2013 and is a continuation of the Phase 1 GGACE pilot project run from 2009 to 2010, which produced civic education teaching resources for schools in Papua New Guinea. This was only a pilot the second phase will see the materials redesigned and expanded and all schools and teacher training institutions and vocational schools included.*

TIPNG welcomes any partners willing to work with us on these initiatives.

**Coordination**

There is a need for clearer and common distribution strategies. As it was, we were never party to the ESP voter education strategy documents and so our cooperation with other players such as Caritas and the PNGEC was little more than a supply of materials arrangement. However, this was not because we did not try.

Had we all started much earlier we could have developed more productive cooperation and been more able to support each other at events and with logistics.
An obvious area for much enhanced cooperation was the development of key messages and the mediums to be used. This could have been done prior to the release of funding and ideally, at least 30 months prior to the election.

**Counting & Results Reporting**

The counting and results reporting processes were probably the best executed part of the elections in 2012. Although the count was slow, this is to a degree inevitable given the very high number of candidates.

The use of the tablets to quickly report the results worked extremely well especially as the PNGEC website was revised to give constant updates. The use of information technology could probably be further enhanced in the count process with the use of a excel template for form 66b (the Counting Form) so that the totalling that is currently done manually could be automated.

We would also like to see the presentation of Election Journal – and a reading out of the ballot account form, when the ballot box is opened. This should be mandatory so that it becomes part of the overall checking system. Special attention needs to be given to the revised ballot account form with its record of unused ballots as this has not been focussed on before.

In future all regional ballots to be counted in one area in the counting centre. (Currently, it is sometimes done at an open electorate level within the counting centre and then transferred.)

In some cases polling official complained about the actions of scrutineers at the count. Our observations showed however that they added a crucial balance.

Consideration should be given to doing a provisional count of first preferences in the polling place as this will enhance trust. However, this should only be attempted where security is assured and trained staff would be available.

**Domestic Observer Programmes**

Overall TIPNG was very happy with the work done by our domestic election observers. Despite having a hotline and being ready to accept complaints, other than the one or two relatively minor issues that arose, the observation was largely trouble free.
Clearly, citizen observers who are not election experts will continue to be a key mechanism by which we can help build the integrity of the elections in PNG. Election observing is a highly technical process and in PNG especially, complex and expensive to implement.

Overall, TIPNG staff found the whole exercise more complex to implement than at first imagined, and so more resources will have to be dedicated to the task and earlier on.

We have already redesigned the observer manual to better reflect the issues on the ground.

In 2017, especially if the electoral procedures are reviewed and clarified, we think there will be a need to put more emphasis on observer training. Clearly, many of our observers will always be very new to the task – but will make up for their lack of experience with their passion for better elections.

We also think there will be a need to better inform the security services and polling staff of our role and our limitations.

It is TIPNG’s intention that in any upcoming bye elections and possibly even the local level government elections we will mobilise observer teams.

In 2017, we would like to yet again increase the number of observers, so there are at least a few in every electorate. To cover 10% of all polling places covered in 2012 would mean that we would have needed over 1000 observers.

We would also ideally, like to have all observers work outside their own electorate but for cost and logistics reasons this will be difficult to achieve for more than about 20% of the observers.

Conclusions

In this section of the report we have described a large number of initiatives that can be taken to build the integrity of our elections. We also challenge some of the current views about what happens during elections and why it happens. We accept that for many of these proposed changes it may take many years and several election cycles to achieve the shift in attitudes that are so necessary.

What is most clear from our own observations and the other surveys we have done is that the people of our country are impatient for serious change in regards to the elections.

There is an immense amount be debated and then if agreed to – to be implemented by 2017. Therefore we believe there is a need for urgency, and are therefore pleased with the indications or reviews thus far.

We stand ready to work with the government, the PNGEC and other bodies to build upon the strength of the electoral integrity institutions.

Note:

TIPNG is currently preparing a discussion paper that proposes some more radical changes in both the organization of the electoral commission and the elections themselves. We have separated out this paper as the suggestions did not come from our observers.
Section Four: Summary of Recommendations

This section summarizes some of our recommendations for major changes, in the organization of the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission and some fundamental changes in the electoral system to incentivise behaviour that will lead to more democratic elections as well as simple procedural changes that could occur at the polling place. These recommendations include both ideas from our observers and from TIPNG as an organization.

Increase the Focus on Compliance with Rule Of Law:

1. In creating a society where impunity is no longer tolerated we call on all Papua New Guineans, and in particular those responsible for the creation and enforcement of laws, to agree that there will be no further tacit or blatant acceptance of illegal activities and procedures in relation to elections. We need to agree as a nation that criminal acts should be investigated and punished.

2. The Electoral Commission needs, with the support of law enforcement agencies and all implementing agencies, to review procedures and laws relating to elections, identify where they are not being followed, and then look for ways compliance can be greatly increased. In some cases, such as with the secret ballot, where design means that compliance is inherently difficult, the design or content of the laws and procedures should be reviewed. However, any changes must meet international standards.

3. Conduct a careful review of the electoral legislation using an elections law expert with vast international experience. There are gaps such as when campaigning can legally take place and the actual polling hours. Campaign financing also needs to be looked at carefully.

4. Consider the legal implications and advantages of expanding the terms of references of the PESCs so they provide oversight on the Election managers finance and recruitment decisions. Also consider broadening the composition of these committees to ensure they provide adequate cross party and possibly civil society representation.

Investigation and Complaints

4. Establish an Investigation Unit which reports directly to the Electoral Commissioner. The investigation unit would have a set of “red flags” which would trigger an investigation. These red flags would include such things as:
   a) No unused ballots
   b) 100% for a candidate in any one box but where in other boxes less than 5% of ballots are for that candidate
   c) Accusations of oversupply of ballots
   d) Accusations of RO or ARO bias or hiring where there is a conflict of interest
   e) Accusations of non PNGEC staff grossly interfering with polling process

The investigation unit would also examine complaints by voters and others made during polling although we are not suggesting that they in any way take over from the court of disputed returns.
**Conflict Mitigation**

5. Set up a conflict management unit within the PNGEC to proactively work in communities where electoral violence is likely to occur.

**Identify priorities for Electoral System Reform**

6. Review the Electoral System and determine if it is achieving its aims and what modifications may lead to more free and fair elections and incentivise voters to think more about national governance issues. This should include careful consideration of what types of electoral systems are used elsewhere (especially in other tribalized societies) and the incentives they create and the justifications for their use.

**Improve Polling Official Training**

7. Training department needs to be formally re-established in the PNGEC human resources structure. (Apparently, it was disestablished in 2008. Regina Lunge currently is part of the policy section.)

8. Continue the work started (but not finished) to review procedures, forms and the manuals that support them.

9. All teachers and those interested to be trained to achieve an election administration diploma. No PO or APO to be appointed without this qualification unless it can be clearly shown none are available. Rather than provide training just before election this would be done a year before. And then a refresher just before. (Provincial trainers to be appointed)

10. More training for scrutineers on process and what to look for. Materials to be designed by PNGEC and given to parties to reproduce and distribute.

11. More training for police on proper polling procedures and rules of engagement - This training to be built into basic police training and not left until just before the elections.

**Improve the Accuracy of the Electoral Roll**

12. Ensure voters are not charged for viewing the roll – electronic copies to be given freely to political parties.

13. Consider the influence of family order roll as it discourages first come first serve polling. If retained conduct integrity checks for where number of non-family order names exceeds those of family order as these are probably ghost names.

14. Encourage parties and candidates to give voter slips with voter name and number if voter cards not introduced.

15. Consider preparing new rolls. Audits to be done and comparison made with church records, & bank records, ward record books etc.. Encourage mobile phone providers to register all sims with names and locations and use this also for data matching.

16. Give unique codes and have GPS coordinates for all localities. Localities, where possible to be based on schools clinics etc. All enrolled voter entries to be linked to these locality codes in the enrolment database.
17. Set up a system whereby when people enrol they give their mobile number (if they have one). Later they can send an SMS to a specific number set up by the PNGEC which would send a reply confirm that they are on the roll and give enrolment identity numbers. Later on in the electoral cycle voters could send an SMS and get back a message containing the site of the polling place with a locality description.

18. Enrolment claim form 11 to be redesigned with a receipt. If photo voter list not fully introduced, as an interim measure, consider giving all voters an enrolment receipt which gives the name, sex, age, voter number, and locality name and code. Voters should be encouraged to bring this to the polling place and then instead of the polling clerk trying to find a name that is mumbled by the voter they would imply look up the number. If voters were in the wrong location the poll clerk could have a directory of localities which they could use to explain where the person is supposed to vote.

19. Trial a Photo voter list with multiple biometric features. Voters to be issued with an ID card that is used for other services and which should be presented at polling place for identification purposes. It could even be clipped each time a voter votes which would then allow for the ink to be abandoned.

20. Need for new boundaries commission report after common roll is renewed. To help ensure this is passed by parliament – there needs to be a campaign in the media so all stakeholders understand the issues created by disproportionate electorates so that they can lobby MPs.

21. Consider ways to have automatic invalidation of box or abandonment of polling where common roll not used.

Improving the Organization of Polling Places

22. Review locations of polling places and set by latitude & longitude coordinates. Ideally no polling place would be located more than 4 km away from 50% of those on ward roll.

23. Set a legal limit of 600 voters per polling place and team. (Combining places with multiple teams probably encourages manipulation.)

24. A minimum of cardboard voting compartments per polling place based on a formula which gives a voting compartment for every 150 voters on the common roll.

25. Cardboard Voting compartments to be redesigned with how to vote information and make greater use of “How to Vote” poster.

26. Polling in school buildings to be promoted with PNGEC. Uncovered voting open to the weather to be strongly discouraged.

27. Have a minimum requirement of one ballot box for each type of ballot. (One regional box and one for open)

28. In coastal areas a box should be used for one day only and then closed along with journal for that polling place. (Perhaps smaller nesting boxes to be considered.)
29. Have a polling day complaints process whereby there is a set form that can be used. Scrutineers would fill these out and leave a copy with the presiding officer who would then register these and submit the copy along with the election journal.

30. Examine if ballot box seals can be purchased which can only fit one way. (Or at least with marking arrows.)

Expand and Enhance Voter Education

31. Funding for voter education to be available at least 24 months before elections. Conduct the bulk of voter education over a 21 month period which largely stops in the three months prior to polling.

32. Work out common distribution strategies and key messages prior to funding.

33. Key areas for message development are:
   a. correcting misunderstanding of roles of MPs
   b. first come first serve voting and use of roll (ideally shown as a video)
   c. proper process - modelling of proper polling place procedures to be produced and shown repeatedly on NBC.

34. Prepare a Basic Election Procedures book for villages describing basic procedure and villages (this could make extensive use of pictures).

35. If the current ballot paper design is retained – much more voter education on how to vote is needed.

36. Give support for civil society and the mass media for the promotion of political party debates and comparisons.

Improve Counting

37. Insist on presentation of Election Journal when ballot box is opened – and special attention to be given to the revised ballot account form with its record of unused ballots.

38. Organize counting centres so that regional ballots are counted in one area in the counting centres. (Currently, it is sometimes done at an open electorate level within the counting centre and then transferred.)

Enhance the Domestic Observer Programmes

39. Have more observers and try to have them work outside their electorate.

40. Police and security personnel to be better advised of observer role and their need to protect observers from intimidation.
### Appendices


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Also sometimes known as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polling</td>
<td>The process of collecting votes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling location</td>
<td>A geographic description of where the polling place is.</td>
<td>Polling Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling booth</td>
<td>The marked off area where polling is conducted</td>
<td>Polling station, Polling place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling place</td>
<td>An area around the polling booth.</td>
<td>Polling Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling team</td>
<td>All the PNGEC officials working at a polling place</td>
<td>Polling staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Compartment</td>
<td>The screen which allows voters to vote in secret</td>
<td>Voting, polling or election booth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Roll</td>
<td>The official list of people who legally can vote</td>
<td>Certified list of voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ward roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter</td>
<td>A person who is eligible to vote</td>
<td>Elector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Paper</td>
<td>The paper the voter marks</td>
<td>Ballot, Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Journal</td>
<td>The book of forms to be filled in for EACH polling booth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrutineer</td>
<td>The person at the polling booth who represents the candidate</td>
<td>Candidate supporter/agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>A person who does not represent any candidate who is able to observe the process.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Elections</td>
<td>Elections to the national parliament</td>
<td>National Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrutiny</td>
<td>The count of the votes</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Election Observation Risk Management Strategy

1. Risk: Observers are Harassed or Assaulted
   a. All TIPNG observers have gone through a training which instructs them to abandon observation if it becomes unsafe to remain at the site of polling. We have pointed out that the most important observation that they can make is that it was unsafe to remain as that indicates it was also unsafe for voters as well and therefore no free and fair environment exists for polling to continue.
   b. All TIPNG observers will be easily identifiable in their T shirt. This T shirt will be shown in advance to the PPCs and community police.
   c. We have a hotline observers can call or text. Hotline staff will log the call and notify the PPC for that electorate. *(Every observer has been given 10 kina of top up credit. They can also send a text asking for a call back. The hotline will be staffed from 8am until 5pm for complaints from the public and 24 hours a day and seven days a week for the polling period. The hotline staff have procedures manual and log sheets and will also be calling observers randomly during the day.)*
   d. The police have been advised of our presence and shown the T shirt.
   e. We have advised observers if necessary to NOT make any written records of serious offences at the site but instead write it down once they get back home.
   f. We have advised observers NOT to discuss what they saw with family and friends until well after they have submitted their data sheets.
   g. All observers will be called after polling.

2. Risk: Observers are unable to return home due to fighting/ flooding/ etc.
   a. We have advised observers that there is little we can do in this case, but that they should try to notify us.
   b. We will then ask the police for assistance with extraction. Observers should be prepared for this eventuality by carrying some money and food and water.

3. Risk: An observer or their family sues TIPNG for compensation after injury or death.
   a. We have got all the observers to sign a declaration form releasing us from any liability.
   b. See all actions taken under Risk 1.
   c. In the training we point out that there are real risks and that TIPNG is not a business and so has no funds to meet compensation claims.

4. Risk: Observers act impartially and in the interests of a particular candidate
   a. On the observer registration form we ask them to declare that they are not relate to or working for any candidate.
   b. In the observer training which all observers must attend we stress that observers must be impartial try to avoid talking to others so as to avoid accusations of impartiality.
   c. We encourage them to observe outside the electorate in which they are enrolled.
   d. On the observer T-shirt we give a number people can call if they see an observer acting
improperly. If we receive a call, we will log it and immediately call the observer and check and dismiss them, if they admit to impartial or inappropriate actions. If they do not admit to breaching the code of conduct, we will ask them to move from that polling place. We will also put aside the observers data sheets when they come in, unless we can be satisfied they have acted impartially.

e. When registering we ask them to declare they will abide by our observer code of conduct. This code is also placed on the front of the data sheet manual. (This code of conduct follows international standards as promoted by IDEA.)

f. In all the provinces where we have high numbers of observers we will have at least one TIPNG staff or board member acting as a coordinator during polling. (We do not think we will have many observations of the count as our volunteer observers will not be able to get that much time off.)

5. Risk: Other people pretend to be TIPNG observers
   a. All TIPNG observers will be easily identifiable in their observer T-shirt and ID card. They will be carrying a TIPNG logoed lanyard, and data collection book of which there is only a limited supply.
   b. Others such as polling staff or scrutineers can ring our office and complain if they see any inappropriate behaviour.

6. Risk: Conflict between observers and polling place staff
   a. In the TIPNG poll worker designed training module we teach about the role of observers and distinguish them from scrutineers.
   b. Observers have an introductory letter explaining their role, which they should give to the presiding officer on arrival.
   c. In the observer training we strongly emphasize to observe but give NO comment or advice to anyone. We point out that the presiding officer has the right to eject them from the polling place if they behave inappropriately.

7. Risk: Journal data is not collected or journal not sent back.
   a. Every observer is supplied with a post-paid addressed return envelope.
   b. Every observer will be called after the polling and reminded to send the datasheets in.

8. Risk: Journal data is not used appropriately.
   a. Initially, after July 10th and once we have received over 200 data sheets we will analyse question 40 which gives an overview as to whether the elections were free and fair. TIPNG will make a press statement about these results. While we will cite examples we will try to avoid naming specific polling places. Following this we will then enter data and do an analysis of all the other questions. This data will be publically available through a report, which we would hope to complete by September 2012. If researchers wish to use our dataset we will consider sharing it if they come from a credible research organization.
   b. All observers have been advised in the training and in the manual itself to keep any information they collect to themselves and NOT to talk to the media.
c. All observers have been told that ONLY TIPNG board members and the senior management can represent TIPNG and give its opinions on the conclusions of the analysis. If we hear of any observers attempting to speak on behalf of TIPNG, we will immediately contact them and demand they desist. If necessary we will issue a statement saying that the observer does not represent the views of TIPNG.

d. TIPNG will NOT be speaking to the media during the polling or counting period unless there is widespread violence and fraud and we believe the PNGEC has not taken sufficient action through the elections advisory committee to correct this problem (possibly through annulment).

Notes:

1. The board and CEO restate that TIPNG wishes to retain the right to use the information it collects in the ways it sees fit... And that the information will not be embargoed by anyone but TIPNG.

2. Topic: How will TIPNG respond to possible requests for evidence from observer journals / observers subpoenaed to the court of disputed returns. While we do not consider this a "corporate risk" we do recognize that this could pose retribution risks for the observer. TIPNG would always follow a court's request and would welcome any prosecution of a candidate found to be in breach of the law, regarding their conduct and the conduct of their supporters. TIPNG has the same position on any PNGEC staff found to be in breach of the law. In reality, we do not think the courts would be likely to use the data sheets but would instead subpoena the observer to appear in court to answer questions. However, we would expect that this would only be done to verify the statements of a scrutineer.

3. Topic: How will TIPNG observe a good range of electorates and polling stations within these electorates *(how to balance urban / rural and remote election processes).* So far we have about 500 registrations from all over the country of which many are women. We do mostly have urban or semi urban dwellers - this is something we cannot do much about as the literate people we need usually live in these places.

4. Topic: Will TIPNG gather data and conduct analysis with a gender disaggregated / people with disabilities focus? There will be no gender disaggregation - this would not fit the current approach which focusses on polling places not individuals. The voter survey is anonymous. *(In hindsight we could have disaggregated this but it is too late now as the data manuals have already been printed.)* Of the 500 observer registrations -190 are women.

However, we do have some questions that focus

- on the access women have to the polling places,
- proper identification of voters
- family voting
- assisted voting
- and the secrecy of the ballot.

We believe these are the most prominent gender issues in elections in PNG.
Appendix 3. TIPNG Election Observer Code of Conduct

1. Do not take sides – remain impartial
2. Always remain safe
3. Do not attempt to resolve any disputes, even if asked to.
4. Do not give advice
5. Do not talk to the media
6. Respect secrecy of the voter
7. Report objectively, accurately and honestly
8. Do not interfere in the election process
9. Do not accept any gifts!


I will:

1. follow the Papua New Guinea Constitution and the Organic Law on National & Local Level Government Elections and PNGEC regulations both before during and after the elections
2. carry out my duties professionally and with care at all times
3. set up the polling place so that voters can be dealt with efficiently
4. treat voters with respect regardless of their background, ethnicity, gender or disability
5. ensure that all who have a right to vote can do so
6. ensure that all persons that do NOT have right to vote do NOT vote
7. refuse gifts or money, or offers of jobs from political parties activists or candidates, or their supporters
8. ensure to the best of my ability that every voter can vote secretly and in private
9. report to the presiding officer any cases where:
   a. any voter offers me bribes or breaks the law and this code of conduct in any way
   b. any person interferes with the rights of voters to vote safely, independently and in secret
10. report to this community immediately any cases where the presiding officer breaks the law, or this code of conduct
11. not support in any way the practise of block voting whereby the right of a secret vote is abused
12. not support in any way the practise of grabbing votes or manipulation of the polling process
13. ensure that at all times the ballot boxes and ballots are protected from interference.
14. carry out my duties in a transparent way so that everything I do can be observed by this community
Appendix 5. List of 282 TIPNG Election Observers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samuel</td>
<td>Ahabh</td>
<td>Moira</td>
<td>Eka</td>
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<td>Rona</td>
<td>Aigilo</td>
<td>Richard</td>
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<td>Aike</td>
<td>Mathilda</td>
<td>Emolle</td>
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<td>Mary</td>
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<td>Prout</td>
<td>Erari</td>
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<td>Tenth</td>
<td>Aipos</td>
<td>Rebecca lavo</td>
<td>Ewa</td>
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<td>Samson</td>
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<td>Justin</td>
<td>Gari</td>
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<td>Eddy</td>
<td>Gean</td>
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<td>Lazarus</td>
<td>Gebio</td>
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<td>Andre</td>
<td>Samuel</td>
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<td>Andrew</td>
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Appendix 6. Candidate Poster and Ballot Paper

These samples give normally literate voters an appreciation of what it is like to be an illiterate voter.

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